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Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage 
Terry S. Kogan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One assumption shared by virtually every commentator who 
addresses same-sex marriage, irrespective of the position taken on that 
issue, is that we know what constitutes a same-sex and what constitutes 
an opposite-sex marriage. I want to challenge that assumption by 
examining a series of marriage cases involving one partner who is either 
a transsexual or an intersexual. 
The irony of the cases I will explore is this: In every case the judge is 
committed to upholding the statutory principle that marriage is the union 
of one man and one woman. Yet, in the struggle to apply this principle, 
these cases illustrate the difficulty and even foolishness in looking to a 
person’s sex as a criterion for marriage. Accordingly, the cases offer 
insights into why society should extend marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. 
These cases raise a fundamental question: For purposes of marriage, 
why do we care how a person’s body is configured? To be blunt, why do 
we insist that one marriage partner have a penis and the other a vagina, 
as opposed to a penis and an artificial vagina, or a vagina and an artificial 
penis, or two vaginas or two penises? This question becomes stark when 
one considers intersexuals (persons who have both male and female 
sexual characteristics). 
Part II examines cases dealing with transsexual marriage. I explore 
what I consider to be three waves of such cases.1 The first-wave begins 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. B.A., 1971, Columbia College; B. Phil., 1973, Oxford 
University; J.D., 1976, Yale University. 
 1. The three waves do not necessarily progress chronologically, but rather in terms of what I 
consider to be approaches that are more respectful and sensitive to the plight of the transsexual 
individuals involved. 
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with Corbett v. Corbett,2 where a British court concluded that a person’s 
physiological characteristics at birth should be the exclusive criteria for 
determining sex for purposes of marriage. In the second-wave cases, 
courts struggle to introduce psychological factors into the determination 
of a person’s sex. Finally, in the third-wave, psychological factors gain a 
certain degree of ascendance over biological factors in determining a 
transsexual’s sex for purposes of marriage. 
Part III then explores intersexuality and the very few cases dealing 
with intersexuals and marriage. In so doing, I examine the way courts 
struggling with transsexual marriage look to the hypothetical case of an 
intersexual as a touchstone to assist in their determination. Intersexuality 
entirely confounds the question of why a person’s physiological 
characteristics (genitals, gonads, and chromosomes) have any bearing 
whatsoever on who should be allowed to marry. The intersexual cases 
represent a transcendence of psychology over physiology in the marriage 
realm. 
Finally, Part IV offers insights that one can gain from the transsexual 
and the intersexual marriage cases in confronting the question of 
extending marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
Throughout this article, I will test the requirements that courts 
impose on transsexuals and intersexuals in marriage cases against what I 
describe as the goals of marriage. Without engaging in extended 
discussion, I view the goals of marriage as fostering stable, long-term, 
mutually supportive, committed relationships between two people in a 
financially sound environment that are conducive to rearing children.3 
II. TRANSSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 
In contrast to the first-wave cases, discussed below, that dealt with 
transsexuality and marriage, more recent decisions have taken a direction 
that has important implications for our society’s struggle with same-sex 
marriage. These later cases move away from mandating what body parts 
are “naturally” meant to interact with other body parts and inquire 
instead into what emotional and psychological goals the marriage 
relationship is meant to foster. Though consideration of physiology has 
by no means been eliminated, it has been forced to move over and allow 
for greater consideration of the psychological aspects of the marriage 
relationship. 
 
 2. 2 All E.R. 33 (P. 1970) [hereinafter “Corbett”]. 
 3. See, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, 
Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Law and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 1023, 1024 
(2001). Of course, if a couple chooses not to have children, then the last goal will drop out of the 
picture. 
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A. The First-wave Cases: Corbett and its Progeny 
The starting point for transsexual marriage cases is the 1970 British 
case Corbett v. Corbett. Before turning to Corbett, however, certain 
terms need to be defined. A transsexual is a person with the physical 
characteristics of one sex who experiences his or her sexual identity as 
being of the other sex.4 This dissonance between one’s body and one’s 
sexual identity is described as “gender dysphoria” or “gender identity 
disorder.” Many transsexuals undergo hormonal and surgical treatments 
to conform their physical bodies more closely to the sex of their sexual 
identity. Transsexuals who have undergone such surgical treatment are 
often referred to as “post-operative.” 
One judge has described Corbett as “the ‘watershed’ decision . . . 
that influenced the British Empire on transexualism and its impact on the 
marriage law and all common law jurisdictions in Western society. . . . 
The Corbett case is so profound and pervasive that it has divided the 
judiciary of the world, wherever, transexualism presents itself as a 
societal issue.”5 
In Corbett, April Ashley was a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual.6 She married Arthur Corbett and, within a few months after 
the wedding, her husband sought an annulment asserting that April was 
actually “a person of the male sex” and, therefore, that the marriage was 
invalid. A secondary issue in the case related to allegations by both sides 
that the marriage was never consummated. 
The judge found the law to mandate that “marriage . . . is and always 
has been recognised as the union of man and woman . . . in which the 
capacity for natural hetero-sexual intercourse is an essential element.”7 
Thus, the issue in the case was whether the “true sex” of April Ashley 
 
 4. While there is no uniformity of usage, medical science often refers to a person’s own 
sense of their identity as male or female as a person’s “sexual identity.” See, e.g., Milton Diamond, 
Sexual Identity and Sexual Orientation in Children with Traumatised or Ambiguous Genitalia, 34 
JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 1999 (1997). Others refer to a person’s sense of their own identity as 
male or female as a person’s “gender identity.” See for example, testimony of Dr. Walter Bockting, 
Ph.D., a Clinical Psychologist at the University of Minnesota, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-
5375CA, at 268 (Fla. 6th. Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003) (“Gender identity is a basic conviction of being a 
man or a woman”) [hereinafter Kantaras]. 
According to Dr. Bockting, “Based on studies in the Netherlands they found that one in 11,900 
persons is a male to female (M to F) transsexual. And one in every 30,400 is female to male.” Id. at 
270. See generally, Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 237 (1998). 
 5. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 535. 
 6. Hereinafter, I will on occasion use the term “M-T-F” to refer to a male-to-female 
transsexual, and the term “F-T-M” to refer to a female-to-male transsexual. 
 7. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 48 (P. 1970). 
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was male or female and, accordingly, whether she could engage in 
“natural hetero-sexual intercourse” as a woman. 
The judge, a medical doctor himself, considered extensive testimony 
from medical experts, who agreed that there were five possible criteria 
for determining April’s “true sex”: 
(i) Chromosomal factors. 
(ii) Gonadal factors (i.e., presence or absence of testes or ovaries). 
(iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs). 
(iv) Psychological factors. 
Some of the witnesses would add: 
(v) Hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as 
distribution of hair, breast development, physique etc., which are 
thought to reflect the balance between the male and female sex 
hormones in the body).8 
After reviewing the medical evidence, the judge concluded: 
It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the 
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the 
latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of 
organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The 
respondent’s operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex.9 
In other words, the law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of 
the doctors’ criteria, ie the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital tests, 
and, if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of 
marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention .10 
Accordingly, the judge refused to consider any social or 
psychological evidence as relevant to determining April Ashley’s “true 
sex.” In attempting to justify his insistence that birth biology be the 
exclusive determinant of sex, the judge stated: 
Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the 
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment 
be, biological, for even the most extreme degree of transsexualism in a 
male or the most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist in a 
person with male chromosomes, male gonads and male genitalia cannot 
 
 8. Id. at 44. 
 9. Id. at 47. 
 10. Id. at 48. 
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reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential 
role of a woman in marriage.11 
Applying this standard, the judge concluded that April was a man for 
purposes of marriage law and that the marriage was invalid. 
Corbett has been harshly criticized by courts and commentators 
alike,12 in particular, its reliance on the notion of “a person who is 
naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in 
marriage,” a concept to which I will return below. Nonetheless, Corbett’s 
conclusion that a person’s sex is determined at birth based exclusively on 
physiological criteria of genitals, gonads and chromosomes has been 
followed by other courts.13 I want to briefly review two such first-wave 
cases, recent decisions of the Texas Court of Appeals and the Kansas 
Supreme Court, before critiquing Corbett and its progeny. 
In its 1999 decision in Littleton v. Prange,14 the Texas Court of 
Appeals confronted a medical malpractice suit against a doctor by a 
decedent’s transsexual wife pursuant to Texas’ wrongful death statute. 
The doctor defended by asserting that the plaintiff was a man and 
therefore could not be the decedent’s surviving spouse and wrongful 
death beneficiary. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment to 
the defendant. 
On appeal, the court framed the issue as follows: “Can there be a 
valid marriage between a man and a person born as a man but surgically 
altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman?”15 In responding 
to this, the court deferred to the legislature for guidelines dealing with 
transsexuals and marriage. Determining that no such guidelines existed,16 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Commentaries criticizing the Corbett decision include: Alec Samuels, Once a Man, 
Always a Man; Once a Woman Always a Woman - Sex Change and the Law, 24 MED., SCI. & L. 
163-66 (1984); Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. 
REV. 236, 253  (1971) (“refusal to reclassify the sex of a post-operative transsexual seems 
inconsistent with the principles of a society which expresses concern for the privacy and dignity of 
its citizens”); H. R. Hahlo, Sex Change Operations and the Law, 1970 S. AFR. L. J. 239 (1970); 
David Green, Transsexualism and Marriage, 120 NEW L. J. 210 (1970); John Dewar, 
Transsexualism and Marriage, 15 KINGSTON L. REV. 58 (1985); Margaret Otlowski, The Legal 
Status of a Sexually Reassigned Transsexual: R v. Harris and McGuiness and Beyond, 64 Australian 
L.J. 67 (1990). 
 13. For courts following Corbett, see for example Bellinger v. Bellinger, 1 All E.R. 311 
(C.A. 2002), aff’d, Bellinger v. Bellinger, 2 All E.R. 593 (H.L. 2003) and In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio 
Misc. 2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). 
 14. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
 15. Id. at 225. 
 16. Id. at 230. 
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the court found there to be no disputed issues of fact and upheld the grant 
of summary judgment.17 
Given that it found there to be no disputed question of fact, how did 
the Littleton court determine that the plaintiff remained a male despite 
reassignment surgery? It did so by concluding as a matter of law that 
because the plaintiff’s external female anatomy was “all man-made,” and 
because sex reassignment surgery could not give plaintiff “the internal 
sexual organs of a women [sic] . . . no womb, cervix or ovaries,” then 
“[b]iologically a post-operative female transsexual is still a male.”18 
Without directly saying so, the Littleton court fully embraced Corbett’s 
conclusion that a person’s sex is, as a matter of law, determined at birth 
and cannot be changed by subsequent surgery.19 Like Corbett, it gave no 
consideration whatsoever to recent medical evidence that has emphasized 
the importance of social and psychological factors in determining a 
person’s sex. 
In its 2002 decision in Estate of Gardiner,20 the Kansas Supreme 
Court refused to recognize a marriage between a man and an M-T-F 
transsexual as valid. The case involved a dispute between the transsexual 
widow and the decedent’s estranged son, who challenged the widow’s 
right to inherit, claiming she was a man for purposes of the Kansas 
marriage statute. The trial court granted summary judgment to the son, 
basing its decision on Littleton v. Prange. The Court of Appeals 
overturned the grant of summary judgment, criticizing the reasoning in 
Littleton as “a rigid and simplistic approach.”21 It remanded the case for 
the determination of the widow’s sex, ruling that the trial court must 
consider multiple criteria considered relevant by modern medicine in 
addition to chromosomes.22 
In reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment, the Kansas Supreme Court relied in large 
part upon Webster’s Dictionary to determine that, as a matter of law, the 
transsexual widow was not a woman: 
 
 17. The dissent harshly criticized the majority for its refusal to recognize the existence of 
disputed material facts concerning the plaintiff’s gender. Id. at 231. 
 18. Id. at 230. 
 19. Id. at 230-31. 
 20. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
 21. 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. App. 2001). 
 22. Id. (“On remand, the trial court is directed to consider factors in addition to chromosome 
makeup, including: gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, 
phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender of rearing, and sexual identity.  The listed criteria we adopt 
as significant in resolving the case before us should not preclude the consideration of other criteria as 
science advances.”) 
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The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” in everyday understanding do 
not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of “persons 
of the opposite sex” contemplates a biological man and a biological 
woman and not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A 
male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of 
a female. . . . As the Littleton court noted, the transsexual still 
“inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians 
have supplied.” J’Noel does not fit the common meaning of 
‘female.’”23 
The truth of the matter is that, “in everyday understanding,” J’Noel 
also does not fit the common meaning of male, which the court 
concluded she was as a matter of law. There simply is no everyday 
understanding concerning the sex of transsexuals, and the court’s feeble 
attempt to rely on such an understanding provided weak justification for 
overturning the intermediate appellate court’s well-reasoned decision. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, seemed to venture beyond 
Corbett in suggesting that an M-T-F transsexual is neither male nor 
female for purposes of the Kansas marriage statute: “We view the 
legislative silence to indicate that transsexuals are not included. If the 
legislature intended to include transsexuals, it could have been a simple 
matter to have done so.”24 Having undergone irreversible sex 
reassignment surgery, the post-operative transsexual inhabits a 
netherworld between male and female, a world in which marriage is not 
an option. The Court however backs away from this conclusion in the 
last paragraph of the opinion where it states that “J’Noel remains a 
transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage under [the Kansas 
statute].”25 
First-wave cases, including Corbett, Littleton, and Gardiner, all 
conclude that a person’s sex is irreversibly determined at birth based 
exclusively on physical attributes (genitals, gonads, and chromosomes). 
Every first-wave case concludes this as a matter of law, a disturbing 
judicial result in light of the extensive medical testimony elicited 
suggesting that a person’s psychological attributes are a very significant 
factor in determining an individual’s sex. Each of these cases raises 
directly the question of why, for purposes of marriage, do we care how a 
person’s body is “naturally” configured at birth? A clue to the answer is 
given by the Corbett court when it notes that “the most extreme degree 
of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance 
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and 
 
 23. 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002). 
 24. Id. at 136. 
 25. Id. 
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male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of 
performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.”26 In other words, 
only a person born with those bodily characteristics traditionally 
associated with being a woman will be “naturally capable” of fulfilling a 
woman’s essential role in marriage. What is that essential role that 
requires so specific a bodily configuration at birth, and what is required 
to be able to perform that role “naturally?” 
Let us examine this question: 
1. Perhaps the essential role of a woman in marriage is to procreate. 
But, procreation cannot offer a justification for insisting that two bodies 
be configured from the time of birth in a particular way in order to marry 
one another. To begin with, a post-operative transsexual is always sterile, 
so the individual’s procreating biologically is never a possibility. Yet this 
fact alone cannot preclude a transsexual from marrying, since we do not 
require that anyone else commit to or be capable of procreating as a 
precondition for marriage. Many couples choose not to have children. 
Some infertile couples have children through adoption, surrogacy, or 
alternative reproductive technologies.27 In fact, in several cases the 
transsexual in the marriage had adopted the children of his or her 
partner.28 Therefore, the ability to procreate biologically cannot justify a 
requirement that two people be born with particular body parts in order 
to marry. 
2. Perhaps the essential role of a woman in marriage relates to the 
ability to engage in sexual intercourse as a woman.29 But this 
justification also fails. To begin with, the evidence at trial established 
that April Ashley was able to engage in intercourse with her post-
 
 26. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 48 (P. 1970). 
 27. The Australian appeals court in Kevin v. Attorney-General (Cth) (2001) 165 F.L.R. 404 
[hereinafter “Re Kevin”], aff’d Attorney-General (Cth) v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300 [hereinafter 
“Re Kevin appeal”]), stated: “Like the trial judge, we reject the argument that one of the principal 
purposes of marriage is procreation. Many people procreate outside marriage and many people who 
are married neither procreate, nor contemplate doing so. A significant number of married persons 
cannot procreate either at the time of the marriage or subsequently — an obvious example being a 
post-menopausal woman. Similarly, it is inappropriate and incorrect to suggest that consummation is 
in any way a requirement to the creation of a valid marriage.” Id. at 328. 
 28. See, e.g., Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 421 (Cir. Ct. 6th Dist. Fla. 2003). 
 29. The Corbett judge suggested this directly when he stated: 
[S]ex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage because it is 
and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman. It is the institution on 
which the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse is 
an essential element. It has, of course, many other characteristics, of which 
companionship and mutual support is an important one, but the characteristics which 
distinguish it from all other relationships can only be met by two persons of opposite sex. 
Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 48 (P. 1970). 
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operative body.30 Other first-wave cases elicited similar evidence.31 
Thus, the ability to fulfill a woman’s role in sexual intercourse cannot be 
the reason that the Corbett, Littleton, and Gardiner judges refused to 
recognize the M-T-F transsexuals as women. 
3. Perhaps the reason first-wave cases refuse to recognize M-T-F 
transsexuals as women is because they are not born with vaginas. The 
Corbett judge seems to conclude that engaging in intercourse with a 
surgically-created vagina is not “natural hetero-sexual intercourse.” 
Throughout the opinion the judge displays continuing discomfort in 
choosing nouns to refer to April’s surgically-created body. Though he 
opts to refer to her “so-called artificial vagina,”32 at one point he states 
that his preferred referent is “cavity which opened onto the perineum.”33 
Imposing a requirement that, to marry as a woman, one must have 
been born with a vagina would disqualify many chromosomal women 
from marrying who, for medical reasons, need surgery to enable them to 
engage in intercourse.34 In fact, an earlier British case, S. v. S. (otherwise 
W.),35 concluded that a woman born without a vagina or uterus who had a 
surgically-created vagina was eligible to marry. In that case, the husband 
argued that the marriage was a nullity because the wife’s artificial vagina 
would not allow for natural heterosexual intercourse.36 In rejecting this 
argument, the court stated: 
 
 30. Id. at 41 (A medical witness testified: “[April Ashley’s] vagina is of ample size to admit a 
normal and erect penis. The walls are skin covered and moist. There is no impediment on ‘her part’ 
to sexual intercourse.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1092 (Kan. App. 2001) (“J’Noel has a ‘fully 
functional vagina’ and should be considered a functioning, anatomical female.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 49-50 (P. 1970). 
 33. Id. at 36 (“I have been at some pains to avoid the use of emotive expressions such as 
‘castration’ and ‘artificial vagina’ without the qualification ‘so-called’, [sic] because the association 
of ideas connected with these words or phrases are so powerful that they tend to cloud clear thinking. 
It is, I think, preferable to use the terminology . . . a ‘cavity which opened onto the perineum.’”). 
 34. The trial court in Re Kevin, (2001) 165 F.L.R. 404, 422 stated: “Given that marriage is a 
social and legal institution which includes people who are infertile or by reason of illness or 
otherwise are unable to engage in genital penetrative intercourse, it seems to me odd, rather than 
self-evident, to treat capacity for genital intercourse as ‘the essential’ role of a woman (or a man) in 
marriage.” See also Attorney-General v. Otahuhu, (1995) 1 NZLR 603, 612 (“There are . . . 
circumstances in which reconstructive surgery has enabled a woman to achieve heterosexual 
intercourse which would not otherwise have been possible for her without such intervention either 
because of a congenital abnormality or because of injury. It has never been suggested that merely by 
some injury or abnormality of her vagina a woman ceases to be a woman.”). 
 35. S. v. S. (otherwise W.), 3 All E.R. 55 (C.A. 1962). 
 36. Id. at 59-60 (“In order to constitute true coitus, there must [the husband argues]. . . be full 
penetration by way of a vaginal passage. Here, it is claimed, the wife in her present condition has no 
vaginal passage, and the effect of the operation would not be to create a true vagina but merely an 
artificial cavity. . . . [C]oition by means of an artificial vagina, created where there was none 
before . . . could not be held to amount to “vera copula.”). 
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If neither the ability to conceive nor the degree of sexual satisfaction to 
be obtained is a determining factor, what else, it may be asked, remains 
to differentiate between intercourse by means of an artificial vagina and 
intercourse by means of a natural vagina artificially enlarged? In either 
case full penetration can be achieved, and there is thus complete union 
between the two bodies.37 
Having in effect adopted the very same argument relied upon by the 
unsuccessful husband in S. v. S. (otherwise W.), the Corbett judge 
attempted to distinguish that case by suggesting that it “could be dealt 
with as [a case] of incapacity, and, therefore, it has not been necessary to 
call in question the true sex of the respondents . . . .”38 However, he 
never even tried to explain why April Ashley’s surgery to create a vagina 
could not also be described a case of “incapacity.” Instead, he abandoned 
the discussion of April’s inability to engage in “natural heterosexual 
intercourse” and jumps to the broader question of April’s “true sex.” The 
judge’s only attempt to explain why April could not be deemed capable 
of engaging in natural sexual intercourse occurred in a somewhat 
flippant, yet very revealing, comment near the end of the decision: 
I would, if necessary, be prepared to hold that the respondent was 
physically incapable of consummating a marriage because I do not 
think that sexual intercourse, using the completely artificial cavity . . . 
can possibly be described . . . as “ordinary and complete intercourse . . . 
of the natural sort of coitus.” In my judgment, it is the reverse of 
ordinary, and in no sense natural. When such a cavity has been 
constructed in a male, the difference between sexual intercourse using 
it, and anal or intra-crural intercourse is, in my judgment, to be 
measured in centimetres.39 
The Corbett judge’s concerns become clear. Because of his 
commitment to freezing a person’s sex at birth, and his refusal to take 
psychological testimony into account, he cannot “see” April Ashley as 
anything other than a man. Accordingly, despite her bodily configuration 
at the time of marriage, the judge views any sexual intercourse in which 
she engages with a man as homosexual. Thus, her “cavity which opened 
onto the perineum” was in the judge’s eyes a second anus and not a 
vagina. Having determined that, despite her reassignment surgery, April 
remained a man because she was born a man, the judge concludes that 
 
 37. Id. at 62. 
 38. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 47-50 (P. 1970). 
 39. Id. at 49. 
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April’s engaging in intercourse with a man was unnatural because, in his 
eyes, it was homosexual.40 
In the end, it appears that the first-wave judges in Corbett, Littleton, 
and Gardiner rely upon birth biology to the total exclusion of 
psychological and social criteria in determining a person’s sex to assure 
that they not condone same-sex marriage. All assume that the only way 
to be certain a marriage is between opposite-sexed partners is for one 
partner to have male body parts at birth and the other partner to have 
female body parts at birth. 
The court’s discussion of whether April could engage in “natural 
heterosexual intercourse,” however, is totally beside the point. Our 
society has never required that two individuals be able to prove their 
ability to engage in genital-penetrative intercourse as a prerequisite for 
marriage.41 Why then should that ability be a criterion for determining 
the sex of a transsexual for purposes of marriage? If a couple is content 
with the form of sexual expression they choose, society has no place 
policing whether they engage in traditional heterosexual intercourse. 
4. There first-wave cases suggest that to depart from a reliance on 
birth biology will defy more than mere logic; it will defy the Lord’s 
natural plan for the universe. The Littleton court made this clear when it 
framed its discussion by posing the following question: “The deeper 
philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician change the 
gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person’s 
gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”42 In so framing the 
issue, the court betrayed its underlying belief that determining the sex of 
a transsexual for purposes of marriage has religious dimensions. In 
effect, to determine that a person’s sex can change after birth would be a 
form of heresy. It would defy the Lord’s plan in creating people with 
male or female chromosomes, genitals, and gonads at birth. Accordingly, 
the meaning of the term “natural” in Corbett and the other first-wave 
cases is, in many respects, as much a determination of theology as one of 
fact or law. 
In the end, the first-wave cases portray a desire to punish 
transsexuals for attempting to fool Mother Nature. Ignoring the realities 
of post-operative transsexuals’ lives — in particular, the fact that their 
 
 40. See also Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988) (discussing the cultural discomfort 
with anal sex). 
 41. Though historically the inability to consummate a marriage was grounds for annulment 
(and not an automatic basis for invalidity of a marriage), more and more jurisdictions are deeming 
that failure to be one ground for divorce based on incompatibility. See, e.g., Re Kevin, (2001) 165 
F.L.R. 404, 465-66. 
 42. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
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bodies exist irreversibly in their reassigned genders — these courts are 
unwilling to set aside social and theological assumptions about the 
inherent nature of the world. According to first-wave courts, there are 
two and only two sexes; a person’s sex is determined at birth and is 
immutable; we should not surgically fool around with the Creator’s 
natural way of things; and, finally, the natural order mandates that only 
people of different sexes (determined at birth) should be allowed to 
marry. 
5. One additional concern emerges among first-wave courts — the 
need for clear, certain criteria by which to determine a person’s sex. 
Unlike Corbett, several recent first-wave courts have given greater 
credence to medical testimony concerning psychological sex. 
Nonetheless, these courts ultimately rely on Corbett’s physical criteria 
out of a fear of what might result absent such clear criteria. For example, 
in Bellinger v. Bellinger,43 though the English court recognized the 
advances in medical science since Corbett was decided in 1971,44 it 
ultimately followed Corbett’s strict reliance on birth biology. “To 
choose, however, to recognise a change of gender as a change of status 
would require some certainty and it would be necessary to lay down 
some pre-conditions which would inevitably be arbitrary.”45 The only 
safe way to settle this question is to rely upon the certainty of a person’s 
physical configuration at birth. 
Being able to adjudicate cases using clear criteria is indeed important 
for courts. However, as illustrated by the second and third-wave cases 
discussed below, courts are perfectly capable of dealing with less than a 
bright line rule in determining a person’s sex for purposes of marriage. 
The suggested fear of social chaos is a poor excuse for the first-wave 
court’s failure to accept the complex realities, uncertainties, and indeed, 
ambiguities of transsexuals’ lives. 
6. The extreme irony of Corbett, Littleton, Gardiner, and other first-
wave cases is clear. In their zeal to prohibit same-sex marriage, the 
judges reach a truly bizarre result: An individual who on the day of her 
wedding has the sexual identity of a woman, and has irreversibly altered 
 
 43. 1 All E.R. 311 (C.A. 2002), aff’d, Bellinger v. Bellinger, 2 All E.R. 593 (H.L. 2003). 
 44. The trial judge concluded: 
There is now a distinct possibility that were it possible to do so, examination of the brain 
of a living individual would reveal further indications of gender. But that is not yet 
possible and the practical reality is that whatever may ultimately emerge from advances 
in medical science, the only criteria for determining the gender of an individual remain 
those identified in Corbett’s case. 
1 All E.R. at 314. 
 45. Id. at 334. 
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her body into that of a woman, is legally allowed to marry only another 
woman. 
This irony is intensified in light of the understanding of medical 
science that there is no necessary connection between sexual identity and 
sexual orientation. That is, some M-T-F transsexuals who are sexually 
attracted to women. They self-identify as women for purposes of their 
sexual identity, and as lesbian for purposes of their sexual orientation. 
Under the first-wave cases, such an individual who deemed herself a 
lesbian would legally be allowed to marry only another woman. 46 
In their zeal to assure that marriage remain a heterosexual institution, 
first-wave judges have reached a conclusion that, to any outside 
observer, would appear to condone same-sex marriage. The very result 
that they struggled to avoid — same-sex marriage — is ironically, the 
only one remaining open to April Ashley and the other transsexual 
litigants in the first-wave cases. 
B. The Second-wave Cases – Rejecting Corbett 
The second-wave cases, explored below, shift the relevant time for 
determining a transsexual’s sex for marriage purposes from birth to the 
time of marriage. But why should a person’s bodily configuration on the 
date of marriage be more relevant to marriage than birth biology? This 
question must be confronted in exploring the second-wave cases. 
The first transsexual marriage case to depart from Corbett was the 
1976 New Jersey case of M.T. v. J.T.47 In that case a post-operative, 
male-to-female transsexual was seeking support and maintenance from 
her husband after separation. In response, her husband claimed that, 
because she was a male at the time of marriage, the marriage was void. 
Accepting that marriage requires that partners be of opposite sexes, 
the court explicitly rejected Corbett’s conclusion that, for purposes of 
marriage, sex is determined at birth and, moreover, that biology is all that 
matters in determining a person’s eligibility for marriage. Instead, the 
 
 46. This happened in Texas after the Littleton decision. Sharon E. Preves explains: 
Upon learning about the newly established legal definition of sex in their state, a Texas 
lesbian couple,  . . . decided to give legal marriage a try because [one] is a male-to-female 
transsexual like Littleton and Gardiner. Since Texas had defined legal sex on a 
chromosomal basis, the two women figured their XX and XY status would give them a 
shot at legal marriage in the state . . . . [T]hey traveled to Bexdar County, Texas, where 
the Littleton case was heard. One September 16, 2000, the two women legally married. 
SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED SELF (2003) 38 [hereinafter, 
“PREVES, INTERSEX”]. 
 47. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). In fact, an earlier New York case was the 
first to recognize a transsexual’s post-operative sex as legally valid. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971) (dealing with a transsexual’s right to change a birth certificate and the first 
to adopt the harmonization test relied upon by the second-wave cases). 
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court embraced the importance of a person’s psychological sex.48 In 
directly rejecting the analysis of Corbett, the M.T. v. J.T. court adopted a 
hybrid determination based on both anatomy and psychology. 
Specifically, the court concluded that if an individual’s anatomy is 
harmonized through surgery with that individual’s sexual identity, that 
individual will be considered to be a member of his or her reassigned sex 
for purposes of marriage.49 But the court required more than just surgery. 
It also considered “the sexual capacity” and “emotional orientation” of 
the transsexual “to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or a 
female.”50 Thus, “harmonization” entails more than just the surgical 
alignment of the transsexual’s body with her sexual identity. It also 
requires the capacity to sexually function in the reassigned sex. The court 
makes clear that the transsexual must be able to sexually function as a 
heterosexual, in an opposite-sexed relationship. Thus, the court set forth 
its test for determining a transsexual’s sex for marriage purposes as 
follows: 
If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative 
transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the 
full capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case may 
be, we perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason 
grounded in public policy to prevent that person’s identification at least 
for purposes of marriage to the sex finally indicated.51 
Applying this test, the court concluded that the “plaintiff should be 
considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes.”52 
Following M.T. v. J.T., other second-wave cases also shifted the time 
of inquiry into a person’s bodily configuration from birth to marriage.53 
In looking to the day of marriage, these second-wave courts impose two 
requirements on a transsexual for that individual to be recognized in the 
reassigned sex for purposes of marriage. First, the individual’s external 
physical characteristics must harmonize through surgery with the 
person’s sexual identity. Second, the transsexual must have the full 
capacity to perform heterosexually in the reassigned sex. Again, we 
 
 48. M.T., 355 A.2d. at 209 (“The evidence and authority which we have examined, however, 
show that a person’s sex or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, that is, one’s self-image, the 
deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character.”). 
 49. Id. (“We are impelled to the conclusion that for marital purposes if the anatomical or 
genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform to the person’s gender, psyche or 
psychological sex, then identity by sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 210-11. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See for example the New South Wales case of Harris v. McGuiness, (1988) 35 A. Crim. 
R. 146 (rejecting Corbett and applying the harmonization principle of M.T v. J.T. to the criminal 
law). 
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return to the fundamental question: Why should a person’s physical 
characteristics or sexual capacity on the date of marriage matter? 
I will first explore the second requirement, capacity to perform 
sexually, and then return to the surgery requirement. As argued above, 
procreation cannot offer any justification for requiring that a person be 
able to function sexually to be eligible for marriage. Most significantly, 
all transsexuals are sterile and procreation is a non-issue. Moreover, we 
require that no one else be capable of procreating in order to marry. 
The sole justification for requiring that a transsexual be capable of 
functioning sexually in the reassigned sex is a belief that, if the 
transsexual can perform sexually in the reassigned sex, the marriage 
must be heterosexual. 
But is it fair for the state to insist that a transsexual perform sexually 
in any particular way to allow the individual to marry? We never insist 
that others seeking a marriage license prove their sexual prowess. 
Though in some states and other countries inability to consummate a 
marriage may be grounds for either annulment or divorce, it is never a 
prerequisite to a marriage license. If a couple decides to marry and the 
partners are content with their chosen forms of intimacy, that is all that 
should matter.54 It is entirely unfair to impose a requirement on 
transsexuals imposed on no one else. 
There is a second unfairness inherent in requiring a transsexual to 
function sexually in the reassigned sex. Given the current state of 
medical technology, the standard is highly discriminatory against female-
to-male transsexuals. Many F-T-M transsexuals choose not to undergo 
phalloplasty both because of the complications often associated with the 
surgery and because of the extraordinary costs. Moreover, even if such 
surgery is undertaken, it does not result in the individual’s having male 
genitals that can function sexually. The second-wave cases all involved 
M-T-F transsexuals where, as a practical matter, engaging in intercourse 
as a woman is a simpler proposition. The courts rarely considered the 
impact of the sexual function standard on F-T-M transsexuals. 
However, one second-wave court did recognize this unfairness and, 
accordingly dispensed with the requirement that transsexuals be able to 
 
 54. In Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003), a third-wave 
case involving an F-T-M transsexual discussed below, an expert witness explained that intercourse is 
not necessary for a fulfilling sexual relationship: 
People for other health reasons or as a result of an accident, lose their sexual function, as 
a sex therapist, “I try to point out that sexuality is a continuum, its not just intercourse, 
it’s not just a penis. There are all sorts of other sexual behaviors . . . I’ve known many 
who’ve had great sex lives, they just don’t have a penis or they don’t have intercourse. I 
mean, that’s not necessary . . . . 
Id. at 389-90. 
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function sexually in their reassigned sex in order to marry. In the New 
Zealand case of Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family Court,55 the judge 
recognized that neither the ability to procreate nor the ability to have 
sexual intercourse is essential for a marriage. Rather “the law of New 
Zealand has changed to recognise a shift away from sexual activity and 
more emphasis being placed on psychological and social aspects of sex, 
sometimes referred to as gender issues.”56 What matters is “[t]he capacity 
for nurturing, support, and companionship.”57 
However, the Otahuhu court does not eliminate consideration of 
biological characteristics in favor of psychological characteristics in 
determining a transsexual’s sex. Rather, it adopted the following 
requirement for recognition of a marriage involving a transsexual 
partner: “[I]n order to be capable of marriage two persons must present 
themselves as having what appear to be the genitals of a man and a 
woman but not necessarily have to prove that each can function 
sexually.”58 The physical appearance of a transsexual’s body replaces 
sexual function as a critical determinant of the transsexual sex for 
purposes of marriage. The court justifies this appearance standard as 
follows: 
A male to female transsexual will have had his penis and testes 
removed, and have had a vagina-like cavity constructed, and possibly 
breast implants. She can never appear unclothed as a male, or enter into 
a sexual relationship as a male, or procreate. A female to male 
transsexual will have had her uterus and ovaries and breasts removed, 
have a beard growth, a deeper voice, and possibly a constructed penis. 
He can no longer appear unclothed as a woman, or enter into a sexual 
relationship as a woman, or procreate.  There is no social advantage in 
the law not recognising the validity of the marriage of a transsexual in 
the sex of reassignment.  It would merely confirm the factual reality.59 
The Otahuhu court, therefore, abandons the sexual capacity 
requirement and shifts to a requirement of appropriate surface 
appearances and the reaction of others to those appearances.60 What 
matters is the “social advantage” that results when other people see the 
 
 55. [1995] 1 NZLR 603. 
 56. Id. at 606. 
 57. Id. at 611. 
 58. Id. at 612. 
 59. Id. at 629. 
 60. See ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE – DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 
126-30 (2002) (describing the Otahuhu case as setting forth an aesthetic requirement for transsexual 
marriage). 
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naked body of the transsexual and accept the individual as a member of 
his or her reassigned sex.61 
But what possible relevance does the meaning given by others to a 
transsexual’s naked body in a locker room have to the goals of marriage? 
What matters is that each partner to a marriage is content and accepting 
of the other’s physical appearance, whatever that happens to be. The 
aesthetic requirement that the two partners to the marriage, when naked, 
appear to others as being of opposite sexes is ridiculous. 
Were the court to drop the “locker room” aspect of the test and 
merely require social acceptance in her reassigned sex, the appearance 
requirement would not necessarily require invasive surgery, as evidenced 
by the success of many drag queens in presenting themselves as women. 
The requirement that a transsexual pass the locker room test is far more 
stringent than merely requiring that acceptance in public as a member of 
the reassigned sex. The Otahuhu court evidences no willingness to 
dispense with the requirement of surgery. Like the sexually functioning 
test, the “locker room” appearance test attempts to police against the 
threat of a same-sex marriage in order to assure that marriage remain a 
heterosexual institution. Our society can feel safe that it has not 
condoned same-sex marriage so long as the bodies of the individuals 
entering into the marriage appear to be of opposite sexes. 
But is it fair to demand that a transsexual pass a locker room test to 
marry? We never inquire into the bodily configuration of anyone else to 
determine whether they should be able to marry; the sex determination 
on a birth certificate is enough to satisfy the state licensing requirement. 
Even if some injury or medical condition would create questions in a 
locker room as to whether the person “appeared” to be male or female, 
nonetheless we never subject any genetic male or female to an 
appearance test prior to marriage. The Otahuhu appearance test has no 
relationship to the goals of marriage, and is no fairer than the 
requirement imposed by M.T. v. J.T. that the transsexual is capable of 
functioning heterosexually in the reassigned sex in order to marry as a 
member of that sex. 
Let us turn then to the requirement imposed by second-wave courts 
that the transsexual harmonize his or her body with the individual’s 
 
 61. The court reinforced the social advantage argument by noting: 
A major factor in marriage is that socially each partner is able to hold him or herself out 
as a person married to a member of the opposite sex. If the complete physical appearance 
of the partners is of persons of the opposite sex then it is difficult to argue that just 
because the appearance of one partner can be attributable in part to surgical intervention, 
that that person should be disqualified from being an appropriate legal marriage partner 
of the other. 
Otahuhu, [1995] 1 NZLR at 612. 
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sexual identity. Why require surgical harmonization? The harmonization 
requirement is a major improvement over the Corbett standard that 
looked exclusively to birth biology. For the harmonization requirement 
recognizes the preeminence of the transsexual’s sexual identity in 
determining the individual’s sex for marriage purposes. The requirement 
takes seriously the conclusion of medical evidence that a transsexual’s 
psychological sense of his or her sexual identity is unchangeable, and 
may override the individual’s genetic identity. Accordingly, the 
individual’s only mutable feature is the configuration of his or her body 
(altering internal and/or external genitals and gonads; chromosomes 
cannot be altered). The second-wave-courts see clearly that to not 
recognize a post-operative transsexual as a member of the reassigned sex 
is inhumane: 
[I]f the new sexual status of the individual is not recognised, that 
person remains in a legal and social limbo as he or she has not acquired 
legal status as a member of the chosen sex but in every other way must 
operate socially and psychologically as a person of that chosen sex.62 
But if in fact a person’s psychological sexual identity is immutable 
and the overwhelming determinant of the individual’s sex, why even 
require that the individual harmonize his or her body to that identity. 
Why require that a person undergo extraordinarily invasive and 
expensive surgery63 in order to be recognized in the sex of the 
individual’s sexual identity.64 Why not simply allow pre-operative 
transsexuals, who may decide for financial or other reasons not to 
undergo surgery, to marry as members of the sex that accord with his or 
her sexual identity?65 
 
 62. Id. at 611. 
 63. See the testimony of Dr. Bockting in Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 274: “The medical 
costs of the surgery are generally not covered by insurance, except for ‘evaluation’ and possibly 
hormone therapy. The cost of female to male genitalia surgery at minimum is $25,000 and goes up 
to $100,000. The other procedures such as ‘chest surgery’ and ‘hysterectomy’ are less expensive but 
several thousands of dollars.” 
 64. The Otahuhu court asked this question directly: “[T]he question must be asked why it is 
necessary that a transsexual should have to go through a risky surgical procedure before he or she 
can be eligible to marry as a person of his or her chosen sex.” Otahuhu, [1995] 1 NZLR at 614. This 
question is pertinent not only to the second-wave cases, but also to third-wave cases discussed in the 
next section, which also require some irreversible surgery. See, e.g., Re Kevin appeal, [2003] 172 
FLR 300, at 365 (“Kevin has always perceived himself to be a man. One then asks the rhetorical 
question as to why he must subject himself to radical and painful surgery to establish this fact.”). 
 65. See, e.g., appellate court in the third-wave case Re Kevin appeal, [2003] 172 FLR at 365 
(inquiring directly about pre-operative transsexuals, “[The requirement of irreversible surgery] has 
the effect of leaving [pre-operative transsexuals] as the only persons in the community who are 
prevented from marrying a person who they legitimately regard as a person of the opposite sex, 
while remaining free to marry a person of their own sex.”). 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
371] TRANSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 389 
Courts offer a number of explanations for the refusal to allow pre-
operative transsexuals to marry in accord with their sexual identity. 
Some courts assert that they need clear criteria such as irreversible 
surgery when trying to determine sexual identity.66 The fear is that 
without such criteria, an individual may attempt to abuse the system by 
fraudulently portraying himself as transsexual, when in fact he is not.67 In 
order to guard against such fraud, a transsexual must undergo full 
surgery that changes the individual’s genitals; hormone therapy alone, 
which may alter some aspects of the transsexual’s body, is not enough.68 
Alternatively, some courts refuse to rely solely on psychological criteria 
to determine sex out of a fear that, absent irreversible surgery, a person 
may on a whim move back and forth between one sex and the other.69 
Courts are terribly vague, however, as to what actual damage might 
result from such fraud. 
Accordingly, irreversible surgery is viewed as an indicator of 
authenticity and commitment. It is the one determinative step taken by a 
transsexual that can exhibit to the world the seriousness of his inner 
 
 66. The appellate court in Re Kevin appeal, 172 F.L.R. at 365, explains: “The reluctance of 
courts to enter this area seems to be based upon something of the same logic as that of Corbett, 
namely an inability to be able to make a physical or scientific examination in order to determine the 
sex of a person.” Similarly, in Re Kevin, the trial court noted that “whatever might be the position 
with pre-operative transsexuals, the irreversible surgery that completes the sex-reassignment process 
provides a convenient and workable line for the law to draw. No significant difficulties are posed by 
including post-operative transsexuals in their reassigned sex.” Re Kevin, (2001) 165 F.L.R. at 474. 
 67. See, e.g., In re Harris, (1988) 35 A. Crim. R. 146, 181 (Austl.). The court rejected a 
suggestion that it “should also treat biological factors as entirely secondary to psychological ones” 
and that “where a person’s gender identification differs from his or her biological sex, the former 
should in all cases prevail,” stating: 
I could not subscribe to this approach. It goes far beyond anything which has so far been 
suggested by even the most progressive of reviews. It would create enormous difficulties 
of proof, and would be vulnerable to abuse by people who were not true transsexuals at 
all. 
 68. See, e.g., Otahuhu, [1995] 1 NZLR 603, 615 (addressing the question of F-T-M 
transsexuals): “If the social and psychological factors are met and the person has undergone 
hormone therapy to produce the secondary male sexual characteristics of body hair and deeper voice, 
and the person has had a mastectomy and a radical hysterectomy, that may be sufficient to establish 
his identity as a male for most purposes but not necessarily marriage.”). 
 69. See Re Kevin, [2001] 1654 F.L.R. 404, 467. 
For most people, being a man or a woman has nothing to do with any election or choice 
by themselves: they just are one or the other, and will be male or female for their whole 
lives. Because of this, and because marriage is a matter of status with legal consequences, 
there may be much to be said for the view that it would be wrong for marriage law to 
embrace a definition that would make one’s sex a matter of personal preference or 
choice. One of the reasons that the three-point biological criterion in Corbett has found 
favour is, I think, that it provides a permanent and clear answer to the question whether a 
transsexual is a man or a woman, and avoids any risk that the law might enable a person 
to change from a man to a woman at will. This is also, I think, why some judges have 
been reluctant to incorporate “psychological” criteria, lest the person’s sex vary 
according to his or her feelings or beliefs at particular times. 
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psychological conviction that he is transsexual. It is a form of trial by 
fire. Only if a person is willing to subject himself to the expense, pain, 
and emotional turmoil of such surgery can a court be comfortable with 
the trustworthiness of medical evidence concerning the person’s 
assertion of transsexuality. Absent so drastic a step, a court could not be 
sure that the person was a “true” transsexual. Equally importantly, 
irreversible surgery assures that, irrespective of a person’s current sense 
of sexual identity, that person will not at some point in the future decide 
to return to his original sex. 
Perhaps most importantly, irreversible surgery assures a court that it 
will not condone a same-sex marriage by allowing two individuals with 
matching genitals to marry. Absent some visible, tangible evidence that 
the transsexual is a member of the opposite sex from his partner, the 
courts fear that they might be condoning same-sex marriage. Even third-
wave courts (discussed below) that do not require that F-T-M 
transsexuals undergo phalloplasty, nonetheless require some irreversible 
surgery for this reason. Third-wave courts realize that it may be unfair to 
require that a transsexual be able to function sexually in the reassigned 
sex; it may also be unfair to require F-T-M transsexuals to have accurate 
physical appearances of the reassigned sex given the difficulties of 
phalloplasty. Yet, despite the lip service that second- and third-wave 
courts give to the centrality of a person’s psychological characteristics in 
determining a person’s sex, in the end, all of these courts revert to a 
Corbett-like standard that relies heavily on external bodily configuration. 
Irrespective of the psychological sexual identities of two people who 
wish to marry, under no circumstances will courts condone the marriage 
of a couple with matching physiologies.70 
The second-wave cases move beyond Corbett in two important 
respects. First, they shift the time of inquiring into the transsexual’s sex 
from birth to the date of marriage, when it is far more relevant. Second, 
in contrast to Corbett, which looked exclusively to birth features of a 
transsexual’s body, the second-wave cases place central importance upon 
the transsexual’s psychological characteristics as relevant to determining 
sex for purposes of marriage. Yet the courts add one additional 
requirement: the post-operative transsexual either must be able to 
function sexually in the reassigned sex or, alternatively, must be able to 
 
 70. In fact, recognizing the irony of first wave cases, the trial court in Re Kevin made clear 
that one reason for allowing a post-operative transsexual to marry in his reassigned sex is to avoid 
the specter of same-sex marriage: “Failing to do so would lead to the odd result that a person who 
appears to be a man, who functions in society as a man, and whose body can never function as a 
woman’s body and has most of the characteristics of a man, would be entitled to marry a man.” Id. at 
474. 
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appear unclothed as a member of that sex, irrespective of the ability to 
function sexually. 
As noted above, both the sexual capacity and the appearance 
requirements pose special difficulties for, and are highly discriminatory 
to F-T-M transsexuals. Moreover, imposing either requirement on 
transsexuals in not only unfair (given that it is imposed on no one else), 
but ultimately bears no necessary relationship to the goals of marriage to 
foster stable, long-term, mutually supportive, and committed 
relationships. Third- wave cases, to which I now turn, take on the 
challenge of dealing with F-T-M transsexuals. 
C. The Third-Wave Cases – The Rise of Psychology 
The two cases that I include in the third-wave — Kantaras v. 
Kantaras71 in Florida and Re Kevin72 in Australia — are unique in that 
each deals with a female-to-male transsexual. In each case, the F-T-M 
transsexual had lived for many years as a man, was fully accepted in his 
community as a man, and was married to a woman. A critical fact in each 
case was that, though the transsexual had undergone reassignment 
surgery in the form of a mastectomy and a total hysterectomy, neither 
individual had undergone a phalloplasty. In other words, each F-T-M 
transsexual seeking to marry as a male still had a vagina. 
Accordingly, neither transsexual could fully satisfy the 
“harmonization test” required by second-wave courts because the 
individual’s body was not “in harmony” with the individual’s 
psychological sex. Similarly, neither seemed capable of satisfying the 
sexual function nor the sexual appearance test since each test turns on the 
post-operative male transsexual having a penis. Kantaras waffled as to 
whether these tests have any continuing applicability. The court in Re 
Kevin rejected both tests. Nonetheless, both courts required that a 
transsexual undergo some irreversible surgery in order to be recognized 
as a member of the reassigned sex for purposes of marriage. 
Re Kevin went further than any previous case by taking seriously 
medical evidence concerning “brain sex,” the theory that transsexuality 
may have a biological basis in the pre- and post-natal development of 
sexual identity in a human’s brain. Accepting the reality of “brain sex” 
directly challenged the distinction between biology and psychology 
relied upon by first-wave courts. Moreover, the evidence reviewed by the 
Re Kevin court suggested that an individual’s “brain sex” has a far 
 
 71. Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003). 
 72. Kevin v. Attorney-General (Commonwealth) [Re Kevin] (2001) 165 F.L.R. 404, aff’d, 
Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300. 
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greater impact on a person’s sexual identity than genitals, gonads, or 
chromosomes. Thus, Re Kevin attacks Corbett for ignoring the most 
important biological basis for determining a person’s sex: one’s brain.73 
In Kantaras v. Kantaras, Michael Kantaras, a F-T-M transsexual, 
petitioned to dissolve his marriage. His wife responded by claiming that, 
because Michael was born a woman, their marriage was void. Custody of 
the couple’s two children was a hotly contested issue, and the wife 
attempted to use Michael’s transsexuality against him on that issue.74 
Though Michael underwent reassignment surgery including a 
mastectomy and total hysterectomy, after careful deliberation Michael 
decided not to undergo phalloplasty because of both cost and infection 
risks.75 Nonetheless, testimony was elicited at trial to the effect that 
Michael had an enlarged clitoris as a result of taking male hormones,76 
which Michael considered to be his penis and which he testified he used 
on occasion to penetrate his wife’s vagina.77 At other times, however, 
Michael testified that he used a prosthetic device during intercourse.78 
In determining that Michael was a male for purposes of marriage, the 
judge relied heavily on testimony from three medical experts: a 
 
 73. It is important to point out a critical difference between Kantaras and Re Kevin. In 
Kantaras, because the F-T-M transsexual’s former wife claimed that her husband was not a male in 
part because he lacked a penis, the court was forced to undertake extensive exploration into the fact 
that Michael Kantaras still had a vagina. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003). 
See, e.g., id. at 280-82, 339-41, 347-50, 359-60, 373-74, 392-95, 409-416, 715, 760-762, 771. In 
contrast, in Re Kevin, the Attorney General (the adversary party) did not challenge Kevin’s assertion 
and the supporting medical evidence that, despite not undergoing phalloplasty, his reassignment 
surgery was complete. Accordingly, little evidence was elicited regarding the fact that Kevin 
continued to have a vagina after sex-reassignment surgery. Thus the Re Kevin court was not 
distracted from its forceful discussion of the centrality of “brain sex” to the legal determination of a 
person’s sex. 
 74. One child was born before the couple met, and was adopted by Michael after the 
marriage; the other was conceived during marriage through artificial insemination by way of 
Michael’s brother. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 5. 
 75. The court noted: 
At meetings of transsexuals who gather from all over the country at least twice a year at 
the Rosenberg Clinic, [Michael] talked to men who had gone through gender 
reassignment surgery and the few who had phalloplasty, about three at most. After 
talking to them, his impression was not to have it done. Because of the risks, extreme 
financial stress it creates and one man had such infections he lost several inches of his 
penis that had to be removed. Not one of them recommended it. 
Id. at 47-48; see also id. at 51. A clinical psychologist testified that in his practice “the percentage of 
female to male transsexual [sic] who have phalloplasty are 10% and 90% do not make that election.” 
Id. at 284. 
 76. The medical expert Dr. Bockting testified that male hormones taken by F-T-M 
transsexuals “do enlarge the clitoris and the clitoris is erectile tissue. It’s out of the same 
developmental structures as the glands of the penis. And the hormones will result in an enlargement 
of that tissue . . . . It looks like a little penis.” Id. at 278. 
 77. Id. at 49-50. His wife stated that, in her view, Michael did not have a “penis,” nor had he 
used his enlarged clitoris for intercourse. Id. at 132-34. 
 78. Id. at 50. 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
371] TRANSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 393 
psychologist with 28 years experience working with and writing about 
transsexuals, the plastic surgeon who had performed reassignment 
surgery on Michael, and the clinical psychologist who evaluated Michael 
as transsexual. In particular, the judge concluded that “Michael Kantaras 
accomplished all that medical science required to succeed in the 
transition from female to male,”79 including satisfying psychological 
tests that he was transsexual, completing the 14-month “real life 
experience” of living as a male, and finally undergoing hormonal therapy 
and reassignment surgery.80 All experts testified that medical science did 
not recommend phalloplasty as a necessary procedure for sex 
reassignment. 
Despite such medical testimony, the judge was deeply concerned that 
Michael had a vagina and not a penis and devoted many of the 800-plus 
pages in his decision to that issue.81 But the judge made clear that his 
concern was not simply that Michael’s body did not aesthetically appear 
to be male. The judge expressed direct concern that sex between Michael 
and his wife might be considered homosexual.82 
 
 79. Id. at 760. 
 80. Id. at 760; see also id. at 341 (quoting the testimony of the plastic surgeon who 
performed Michael’s reconstructive surgery). 
In your opinion, do you believe a female-to-male transsexual who has been diagnosed 
with gender identity disorder or transsexualism who has received the hormone therapy, 
has had chest reconstructive surgery, has had a hysterectomy including the removal of the 
ovaries and all of this was performed in accordance with the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Oysphoria Association’s Standard of Care, do you believe, in your 
opinion, that person should be legally considered a male?” He replied, “In answer to your 
question, yes. I think he should be considered as legally male.” 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 282: 
THE COURT: If their sexual organs are left as they were, you’ve removed by 
hysterectomy all the internal sexual organs, but we’re now dealing with the external, they 
are untouched? 
 A: Yes, Your Honor. If they maintain their vagina they technically could receive a penis, 
could have intercourse with a man. 
THE COURT: Yes. Correct. They could reverse roles and now become a woman? 
A: Technically, yes. But we find that most FTMs, . . . are attracted to women and are 
identified as heterosexuals and most FTMs would not allow that. You know, they would 
feel horrified just by the thought of being penetrated. 
See also supra note 75. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 349 (in a section of the opinion labeled “Lesbian Activity”): 
Dr. Cole was next asked “When a transsexual man has intimate sexual relations with a 
woman is he engaging in a lesbian relationship?” He replied, “Absolutely not.” Then he 
was asked, “How would you classify the sexual orientation of a transsexual man who is 
attracted to women?” The response was “Heterosexual.” By way of explanation he 
testified: “We are dealing with different elements, i.e., one has a gender identity; one has 
sexual orientation; one has an anatomy; one has chromosomes, one has sexual roles,” and 
“I mean sexuality encompasses a whole realm of factors that need to be taken into 
consideration.”; 
see also, id. at 292: 
Q. So a female-to-male transsexual who completes the process, they’re not lesbian? 
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To allay such concern, the judge adopted a two-pronged approach. 
First, to justify Michael’s choosing not to undergo phalloplasty, he 
quotes extensively from testimony to the effect that, at the current time, 
that procedure is less than successful in terms of producing a functioning, 
aesthetically normal-looking penis.83 Second, the judge paid great 
attention to the fact that Michael’s enlarged clitoris could be considered 
to be a small penis, and actually was used by some F-T-M transsexuals 
for penetration during sex.84 The former wife’s attorney continually 
objected to any reference to Michael’s body as having a penis.85 
 
No, they’re not. 
Q. If they’re attracted to women? 
A. No. 
Q. So, they’re a male and they’re attracted to a woman and that makes them 
heterosexual? 
A. Correct. 
Q. If a person begins the sex reassignment process but for whatever reason stops the 
process, does not complete the sex reassignment process and opts to stay a woman and 
that person remains attracted to women, would that person then be a lesbian? 
A. Yes, indeed. 
Q. . . . So even pre-transition, a “female to male” transsexual, some people might 
consider that person prior to their transition since they’re a woman, they might consider 
that person to be a lesbian if they’re attracted to women? 
A. Yes, sometimes. 
Q. Sometimes. And the “female to male” transsexual themselves, is it common, in your 
experience, that although the female-to-male transsexual has a female anatomy and they 
are attracted to women, that they don’t consider themselves to be a lesbian, that they 
consider themselves heterosexual, just in the wrong body? 
A. That’s right. I mean, in the process of attempting to make it work they might try to 
take it on and say, well, maybe I’m a lesbian, but they very quickly find out that - - - 
that’s not it for me. I don’t belong there. That’s not my identity. 
Q. So is there any basis whatsoever for labeling a transsexual man or a “female to male” 
transsexual as a lesbian. 
A. No. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 290. The judge noted: 
When asked would it be consistent with medical ethics to require that type surgery 
(phalloplasty) in order to complete sex reassignment? He replied: “I think it would be 
unethical to require that - - - a still questionable procedure because it could worsen the 
patient’s adjustment.” 
Id.; see also id. at 288, where, the court states: 
Finally, in response to the question “After FTM has undergone chest surgery and total 
hysterectomy, is the sex reassignment process considered complete at that point?” Dr. 
Bockting replied that “for a female to male who is taking hormones, who has had chest 
surgery and the internal organs removed, that would be complete sex reassignment . . . 
because many do not go on and have the phalloplasty because of the limited results.” 
 84. See id. at 280-81, where the judge notes: 
Dr. Bockting said the enlarged clitoris would look like a small penis and the genitals of 
that person would not resemble the genitals of a typical female, “you could tell the 
difference.” “It does swell up during sexual excitement, it is erectile tissue. Some patients 
reported they’re able to have intercourse with it but I think that’s not the norm, but some 
patients do report that.” What about orgasm? “Yes, all of that is retained and actually it is 
a result of the testosterone and the enlargement of the erectile tissue they have – its easier 
for them to reach orgasm. So we fine in research that they are quite orgasmic and 
sexually active.” 
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The Kantaras judge’s opinion is somewhat schizophrenic. He seems 
to adopt a reformist approach that relies heavily on testimony that 
Michael was psychologically and socially regarded as a male, 
irrespective of the configuration of his body. It was enough that Michael 
had undergone irreversible surgery.86 The judge made statements that 
move in the direction of accepting that psychology transcends 
physiology when it comes to determining a person’s sex for purposes of 
marriage.87 
On the other hand, the judge could not seem to abandon the sexual 
function and sexual appearance tests adopted by second-wave courts. He 
tried to satisfy those tests by, in effect, converting Michael’s enlarged 
clitoris into a functioning penis. In confronting the ex-wife’s assertion 
that Michael could not be considered a man because his “sex 
reassignment surgery did not harmonize Michael’s gender and 
genitalia,”88 the judge found as follows: 
It is true Michael still has a vagina. The fact is the clitoris in the vagina 
has enlarged and elongated to form a small penis. The tissue that 
composes the penis is biologically the same tissue in the clitoris. 
Michael testified his penis does erect, sufficient to penetrate and that he 
 
See also id. at 347: 
Dr. Cole was asked “in your professional opinion, can a transsexual man whose genitals 
have been altered as a result of hormone therapy be said to have a penis, albeit a small 
one?” He answered, “Most definitely.” He was further asked, “in your clinical experience 
do most transsexual men view their genitalia as consisting of a small penis after 
undergoing hormone therapy? He said in reply: “That’s correct. After six months or more 
of hormone therapy the clitoris itself is lengthened, enlarged much to the size of a small 
phallus, almost the size of a small finger. 
 85. See, e.g., quoted in id. at 373: 
Q. Well, Dr. Cole, there had been some suggestion in this case that because phalloplasty 
is not currently very successful and because most transsexual men do not obtain it and are 
therefore forced to deal with the reality of having only a very small penis as a result of 
hormones – 
MS. WHEELER: Judge, I’m going to object to counsel’s terminology. It’s not a penis. It 
has the same similar tissue as the plastic surgeon in this case so eloquently and 
articulately described. It is not a penis. This hormone treatment does not turn a clitoris 
into a penis. It turns it into an elongated and enlarged – excuse me. I strike that. The 
clitoris does not have the same function as a penis. The tissue is similar to a penis and 
that is all. It doesn’t urinate like a penis. It doesn’t have a urethra and it’s not a penis and 
I object. He keeps saying that a transgender FTM has a penis and it is not a penis. 
Similarly, see id. at 359: 
MS. WHEELER: Judge, I’m going to object to the witness’ characteristic that it became a 
small phallus unless he can tell us what the measurements are. That’s absolutely, I think 
misleading this record. 
 86. See id. at 761. 
 87. See id. at 766-67 (“Marriage is fundamentally a state of mind, where two individuals 
pledge their love and devotion to each other, in sickness and in health, hopefully, until death do them 
part . . . . If marriage does not rise to the level of an honorable commitment, then the marriage is 
doomed regardless of the sexual aptitude of the couple.”). 
 88. Id. at 715. 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
396 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 18 
has orgasms. This was the natural result of hormonal therapy — and 
not a constructed phallus. The medical experts covered this subject at 
trial and declared Michael to be physically and psychologically male.89 
In the end, the judge reverts to the approach of second-wave cases. 
In determining that Michael was male, he attempted to cover all bases. 
He fully acknowledged the centrality of the medical testimony that 
Michael was psychologically a male, and that he had undergone the 
requisite reassignment surgery. At the same time, the judge felt an 
obligation to satisfy the second-wave tests of function and appearance. 
Though Michael had a vagina, the judge determined that it “was not 
typically female because it now had a penis or enlarged, elongate 
clitoris”90 which was used heterosexually to penetrate his wife. 
In Re Kevin,91 a F-T-M transsexual and his wife filed an action 
seeking a declaration as to the validity of their marriage. The Attorney 
General intervened, opposing the marriage on the grounds that Kevin 
was not a male for purposes of Australian marriage law. The appellate 
court relied upon and quoted extensively from the decision of the trial 
judge, and thus we begin with that decision. 
As was true of every other court facing the issue of transsexual 
marriage, the judge in Re Kevin began with the assumption that a valid 
marriage requires the union of a man and a woman, though he briefly 
explored the view that transsexuals might be considered a third sex.92 
Though Kevin had taken hormones to masculinize his body, and had a 
mastectomy and total hysterectomy, he did not undergo a phalloplasty. 
Like Michael Kantaras, Kevin still had a vagina. Nonetheless, an expert 
testified that this surgery constituted “sex reassignment surgery,” and the 
court concluded that “Kevin’s body was no longer able to function as 
that of a female, particularly for the purposes of reproduction and sexual 
intercourse.”93 
It is not clear from the decision why Kevin could not function as a 
female for purposes of sexual intercourse (other than, of course, his 
psychological identification as a male and his sexual attraction to 
 
 89. Id. at 715. The judge concludes: “As a post operative transsexual Michael Kantaras, is, by 
virtue of all his medical treatment, possessed of the capacity to function sexually as a heterosexual 
male.” Id. at 760; see also id. at 770-71 (“[Michael] was a female transsexual who’s [sic] gender and 
genitalia were once discordant, but now harmonized through medical treatment and who had become 
physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of heterosexuality consistent with his 
reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy as a ‘male.’”). 
 90. Id. at 795 (reciting the Conclusions of Law from the opinion). Also, the judge determined 
that Michael had a “naturally developed penis.”  Id. 
 91. [2001] 165 F.L.R. 404; aff’d,  Re Kevin  appeal, [2003] 172 F.L.R. 300 (Full Court). 
 92. Re Kevin, [2001] 165 F.L.R. at 408-409 (quoting experts who noted that post-operative 
transsexuals themselves wish to be viewed in their reassigned sex, not as a third sex). 
 93. Id. at 411. 
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women). Perhaps most importantly, the Attorney General did not assert 
“that the sex-reassignment surgery was in any way incomplete or 
unsuccessful.”94 Thus, the court was able to avoid having to impose the 
three tests applied by second-wave courts: harmonization, sexual 
function and genital appearance. Unlike Kantaras, the judge in Re Kevin 
was able to deemphasize the importance of genital criteria in determining 
a transsexual’s sex.95 Having set aside the fact that Kevin had a vagina, 
the judge moved social and psychological criteria onto center stage. 
The judge began by reviewing social evidence — evidence as to how 
others reacted toward Kevin. He recounted extensive testimony of 
Kevin’s wife,96 family, friends, and work colleagues, and placed great 
significance on the fact that they had always perceived Kevin to be a 
man. He also noted Kevin’s testimony that “as of the date of the marriage 
his male secondary sexual characteristics were such that he would have 
been subject to ridicule if he had attempted to appear in public dressed as 
a woman, that he could not have entered a women’s toilet.”97 Based on 
the testimony of thirty-nine such witnesses, the judge stated that the 
evidence shows Kevin 
 . . .living a life that those around him perceive as a man’s life. They 
see him and think of him as a man, doing what men do. They do not see 
him as a woman pretending to be a man. They do not pretend that he is 
a man, while believing he is not.98 
The judge then turned to an extensive critique of the Corbett case. 
Without reviewing his entire impressive critique, one section stands out 
in particular. In a passage closely aligned with critical gender studies, the 
judge suggested that Corbett adopted an “essentialist” view of sexual 
identity, “the view or assumption that individuals have some basic 
essential quality that makes them male or female.”99 He rejected this 
approach: 
In the majority of newborns, there is congruence between all relevant 
matters, and the baby is unproblematically male or female. It does not 
follow that there is some further entity beyond or underlying these 
matters that is the person’s underlying sex. In a minority of people, 
various incongruities arise: sometimes within the chromosomes, gonads 
or genitals, sometimes among them; sometimes between the self-image 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra note 75. 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 411 (“Jennifer interacted with Kevin as a man and observed that others 
did the same. She supported him in his desire ‘to bring his body into harmony with his mind.’ It was 
‘obvious’ to her that he was a man.”). 
 97. Id. at 412. 
 98. Id. at 417. 
 99. Id. at 424. 
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and some or more of these facts. Where there are incongruities, by 
definition the person has some characteristics normally associated with 
each sex.100 
Accordingly, the judge elevates psychological self-image to a level 
of importance equal to chromosomes, gonads, and genitals. This presages 
the weight he will ultimately give to brain sex. He then continues: 
The situation presents a question to the individual, and to various social 
systems, as well as to the law, namely how that person’s identity should 
be defined and managed. In other words, the task of the law is not to 
search for some mysterious entity, the person’s “true sex”, but to give 
an answer to a practical human problem . . . .101 
After rejecting Corbett, the judge then sought an alternative 
approach to dealing with transsexuals and marriage, and ultimately 
turned to the extensive medical evidence elicited at trial that “attribute[s] 
to the psychic element, in the determination of sex, an importance at least 
equal to that of the physical element . . . . It is not only the body which 
determines the sex of the individual, it is also the mind.”102 More 
specifically, he concluded that “the evidence about the experience of 
transsexuals, and the strength and persistence of their feelings, fits well 
with the view that ‘transsexuals have a sexual brain development 
contrary to their other sex characteristics such as the nature of their 
chromosomes, gonads and genitalia.’”103 In so doing, the judge took the 
far-reaching step of considering transsexuality to be an intersexed 
condition: 
The argument advanced by the applicant in the present case is that 
recent discoveries show that the traditional understanding, by which 
transsexuals as seen as biologically of one sex but psychologically of 
another, is mistaken. The argument is that transsexuals are as much 
biologically inter-sex as cases of the kind I have mentioned. This is 
because the traditional accounts omit an important component of sexual 
identity, namely a development in the brain.104 
 
 100. Id. at 424-25. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 426 (quoting the Australian case, Secretary, Dept. Of Social Security v. State Rail 
Authority (1993) 43 F.C.R. 299). 
 103. Id. at 462. 
 104. Id. at 457; see also id. at 462-63: 
For Ormrod J and for many of the experts at the time, transsexuals suffered from a 
discontinuity between their biology and their psychology, whereas intersexed people 
experienced inconsistencies within or among their biological qualities. But I am satisfied 
that the evidence now is inconsistent with the distinction formerly drawn between 
biological factors, meaning genitals, chromosomes and gonads, and merely  
“psychological factors”, and on this basis distinguishing between cases of intersex 
(incongruities among biological factors) and transsexualism (incongruities between 
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What distinguishes transsexuals from intersexuals born with 
ambiguous genitals is that, unlike intersexuals, medical science cannot 
determine the incongruity between the transsexual’s brain and other 
bodily features at birth.105 As will be seen in the next section, judges in 
previous transsexual marriage cases have viewed intersexuals 
sympathetically and in a favored position from the viewpoint of law. By 
converting all transsexuals into intersexuals, the Re Kevin judge 
restructures the entire landscape of transsexual cases. 
Though the judge takes the medical evidence seriously, in the end, he 
decides the case by simply determining that the term “man” in the 
Australian marriage law includes a post-operative F-T-M transsexual.106 
The judge explicitly requires that a transsexual have undergone 
irreversible surgery, justifying his conclusion as follows: “[W]hatever 
might be the position with pre-operative transsexuals, the irreversible 
surgery that completes the sex-reassignment process provides a 
convenient and workable line for the law to draw. No significant 
difficulties are posed by including post-operative transsexuals in their 
reassigned sex.”107 After setting forth the criteria that he deemed relevant 
 
biology and psychology). . . . [I]n my view the evidence demonstrates (at least on the 
balance of probabilities), that the characteristics of transsexuals are as much  “biological” 
as those of people thought of as inter-sex. The difference is essentially that we can readily 
observe or identify the genitals, chromosomes and gonads, but at present we are unable to 
detect or precisely identify the equally  “biological”  characteristics of the brain that are 
present in transsexuals. 
 105. The judge quotes from the testimony of medical expert Louis Gooren, a renown 
endocrinologist who works with patients dealing with gender identity disorder: 
Like other people afflicted with disorders in this process of sex differentiation, 
transsexual people need to be medically rehabilitated so that they can live acceptable 
lives as men or women. This decision is not essentially different from the one made in 
cases of intersexed children where assignment takes place to the sex in which they in all 
likelihood will function best. In the case of an intersexed child it is often possible to tell 
at birth, or shortly after birth, that the sexual differentiation process has not taken place in 
a conventional way and so it is possible to make that decision to (re)assign a sex through 
medical intervention shortly after birth. The decision to recommend hormonal and 
surgical treatment for a transsexual person takes place much later in life and is based on 
the conclusion of a thorough psychodiagnostic process that concludes that a disorder has 
occurred in the process of sexual differentiation and that the person will benefit from 
hormonal and surgical sex reassignment. 
Id. at 453. 
 106. See id. at 475: 
It is true that this judgment canvasses some interesting new medical evidence, and that 
the discussion of legal principle has been wide-ranging. While I have made findings 
about the medical evidence and offered a view about the underlying basis for such 
decisions as Corbett, the end result does not depend on acceptance of either of these 
matters. Ultimately, the basis for this judgment is very simple and mundane. It is that no 
good reasons have been shown why the ordinary legal meaning of the word ‘man’, which 
includes post-operative female to male transsexuals, should not also apply to marriage. 
 107. Id. at 474. 
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to determining a person’s sex for purposes of marriage,108 the judge 
concluded “that post-operative transsexuals will normally be members of 
their reassigned sex.”109 
On appeal, the Attorney General argued that the trial court erred by 
not accepting the Corbett criteria that required exclusive reliance on 
genitals, gonads, and chromosomes in determining a person’s sex for 
purposes of marriage; moreover, he argued that the court erred in even 
considering evidence about brain sex.110 In affirming the lower court’s 
ruling, the appellate court quoted extensively from trial judge’s opinion 
and applauded his reasoning.111 
Perhaps most significantly, the appellate court strongly adopted the 
trial court’s view that transsexuals should be viewed as intersexed 
individuals: 
[If] there is substance in the view that brain sex is one of the most 
significant determinants of gender, then the distinction between inter-
sex and transsexual persons becomes meaningless. . . . This is because 
an inter-sex person appears to be defined as someone with at least one 
sexual incongruity. If brain sex can give rise to such an incongruity 
then, legally, we think that there may be no difference between an 
inter-sex person and a transsexual person.112 
In the end, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion 
that the terms “man” and “woman” should be given their “ordinary 
current meaning” for purposes of the Australian marriage act, and that a 
post-operative F-T-M transsexual should be included as a member of 
their reassigned sex for purposes of marriage.113 
Let us examine these two third-wave cases: 
 
 108. Id. at 475: 
To determine a person’s sex for the purpose of the law of marriage, all relevant matters 
need to be considered. I do not seek to state a complete list, or suggest that any factors 
necessarily have more importance than others. However the relevant matters include, in 
my opinion, the person’s biological and physical characteristics at birth (including 
gonads, genitals and chromosomes); the person’s life experiences, including the sex in 
which he or she is brought up and the person’s attitude to it; the person’s self-perception 
as a man or woman; the extent to which the person has functioned in society as a man or 
a woman; any hormonal, surgical or other medical sex reassignment treatments the 
person has undergone, and the consequences of such treatment; and the person’s 
biological, psychological and physical characteristics at the time of the marriage, 
including (if they can be identified) any biological features of the person’s brain that are 
associated with a particular sex. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Re Kevin appeal, [2003] 172 F.L.R. 300, 312. 
 111. The court also made clear what was not in issue before it: “The issue of whether a 
marriage can occur between people of the same sex is not an issue in this case. Similarly, the status 
of pre-operative transsexual persons is not directly in issue.” Id. at 313. 
 112. Id. at 340. 
 113. Id. at 364. 
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1. Because of the difficulty of an F-T-M transsexual’s complying 
with either the sexual function or genital appearance tests, Re Kevin 
eliminated those tests as relevant to the determination of a transsexual’s 
sex. Kantaras adopts reasoning that would support the elimination of 
such tests, but in the end, in a stretch of logic, concludes that Michael 
Kantaras could also satisfy those tests. Elimination of such tests is an 
important step toward fair treatment of all transsexuals, in particular F-T-
M transsexuals who have not undergone phalloplasty. For purposes of 
marriage, if a couple is happy with the way they function together 
sexually and with the appearance with one another’s bodies, those issues 
should be beyond the purview of the state. 
2. Both third-wave cases delve deeply into the social situation of the 
transsexual, not only in terms of his own perception of himself as a male, 
but also the perceptions of family, friends, and work colleagues. These 
courts find that social perception of the transsexual by others is an 
important factor in the courts’ determining whether an individual should 
be deemed a member of his reassigned sex for marriage purposes. But 
why should acceptance by others be a criterion for whether a court 
allows a post-operative transsexual to be recognized in his reassigned 
sex? Of course, it cannot be denied that, psychologically, it matters 
greatly to the transsexual that his community accept him as a member of 
his reassigned gender. However, it may well be easier for F-T-M 
transsexuals to pass as male than for M-T-F transsexuals to pass as 
female, given that our society subjects male bodies to much less scrutiny 
than female bodies when it comes to deciding what is an acceptable body 
type. Imagine a tall, large-boned M-T-F transsexual. Reassignment 
surgery may not be able to mask the individual’s transsexuality, which 
may cause discomfort to others. If a person has been diagnosed by a 
psychiatric professional as transsexual, has completed the “real life” 
experience of living openly for some period in the reassigned gender, and 
has then undergone surgery, why should the response of others to that 
individual’s credibility as a member of the reassigned gender matter? A 
genetically-born woman who is perceived by others as exhibiting 
extremely masculine gender characteristics will never be denied a 
marriage license on that basis. Why should a transsexual be subject to a 
test of social acceptance in order to gain recognition as a member of his 
or her reassigned gender? 
3. We return to the fundamental question: Why should a person, who 
has been diagnosed by a psychiatric profession as transsexual, be 
required to undergo irreversible surgery to marry in accord with that 
individual’s sexual identity? In discussing the second-wave cases, I 
explored the requirement of surgical harmonization between psychology 
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and physiology, and courts’ refusal to recognize pre-operative 
transsexuals in accord with their sexual identity.114 Though the third-
wave cases can be viewed as an improvement in terms of fairness by not 
requiring a post-operative transsexual to have any particular bodily 
configuration, these cases still require some irreversible surgery. 
But why? The judge in Re Kevin noted “[i]t seems illogical that the 
courts can decide that marriage can extend to inter-sex persons, who can 
adopt the sex of their choice, but not to post-operative transsexual 
people.”115 If the Re Kevin court is truly committed to the position that 
transsexuals are intersexed, why allow other intersexed people with 
ambiguous genitals to choose their sex, but require irreversible surgery 
of transsexuals?116 Why discriminate against transsexuals simply because 
their biological conflict is not purely physiological, but instead between 
physiology and brain sex. If third-wave courts truly believe brain sex to 
be more important than physiology in determining a person’s sexual 
identity, transsexuals should have as compelling a claim as other 
intersexuals for being recognized in accord with their sexual identity for 
purposes of marriage. 
In the end, the only explanation for requiring irreversible surgery is 
that suggested above — courts cannot tolerate allowing two individuals 
with identical physiologies to marry, no matter how much lip service is 
given to brain sex. The requirement of irreversible surgery has nothing to 
do with the purposes of marriage —deep emotional commitment 
between two persons — and everything to do with broader social 
concerns about condoning same-sex marriage. 
III. INTERSEXUAL MARRIAGE CASES: THE ASCENDANCE OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Virtually every court considering transsexual marriage, irrespective 
of outcome, has relied upon the hypothetical case of an intersexual 
seeking to marry as a touchstone for determining whether it should allow 
a transsexual litigant to marry as a member of the reassigned gender. 
First-wave cases attempt to distinguish transsexuality from 
intersexuality, and in so doing refuse to recognize a transsexual in accord 
with his or her psychological sexual identity. In contrast, second- and 
 
 114. See supra section II. B. 
 115. Re Kevin, 172 F.L.R. at 340. 
 116. In Bellinger v. Bellinger, Lord Nicholls recognized the important similarities between 
intersexed and transsexual individuals: “[T]he application of the Corbett approach leads to a 
substantially different outcome in the cases of a post-operative inter-sexual person and a post-
operative transsexual person, even though, post-operatively, the bodies of the two individuals may 
be remarkably similar.” 2 All E.R. 593 (H.L. 2003) at ¶13. 
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third-wave cases analogize transsexuality to intersexuality as a 
justification for recognizing the transsexual in accord with sexual 
identity. Irrespective of the outcome concerning transsexuality, every 
court suggests that, were it faced with an intersexual seeking to marry, it 
would probably recognize that individual in accord with his or her sexual 
identity, irrespective of bodily configuration.117 
Because the intersexual’s gonads, genitals and/or chromosomes are 
incongruous and therefore do not clearly point to ascribing any one sex 
to the individual, courts imagine themselves as having little choice but to 
look to psychological characteristics to determine sex for marriage 
purposes. In so doing, intersexuals are given a privileged position, for 
courts make no mention of requiring an intersexual to undergo 
irreversible surgery in order to marry. 
It is estimated that between one and two percent of births involve an 
intersexed child.118 Sharon Preves explains what intersexuality entails: 
[A] conservative estimate is that about two to four thousand babies are 
born per year in this country with features of their anatomy that vary 
from the physical characteristics typically associated with females and 
males. Some are born with genitalia that are difficult to characterize as 
clearly female or male. Others have sex chromosomes that are neither 
XX nor YY, but some other combination, such as X, XXY, or 
chromosomes that vary throughout the cells of their bodies, changing 
from XX to XY from cell to cell. Still others experience unexpected 
physical changes at puberty, when their bodies exhibit secondary sex 
characteristics that are surprisingly “opposite” their sex of assignment. 
Preves describes the causes of intersexuality as follows: 
Some forms of sexual ambiguity are inherited genetically, while others 
are brought on by hormonal activity during gestation, or by prescription 
medication women take during pregnancy. Regardless of its particular 
manifestation or cause, most forms of physical sexual anatomy that 
vary from the norm are medically classified and treated as forms of 
intersexuality, or hermaphroditism.119 
Let us explore why the hypothetical intersexual receives privileged 
treatment in the transsexual marriage cases. 
Once again, the court that blazed the trial for discussion of the 
hypothetical intersexual was Corbett. That court distinguished between 
 
 117. Whether or not these same courts would actually apply this principle to an actual case 
before it is a very different question. 
 118. PREVES, INTERSEX, at 3. 
 119. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the variations of intersexuality and the medical 
causes, see id. at 23-59. See also Julie A Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and 
the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 265, 278-92 (1999). 
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transsexuality and intersexuality by viewing the former as a 
psychological anomaly, as opposed to the latter, which it considered an 
anatomical anomaly.120 After an extended discussion of the physiology of 
intersexuality, the judge rejected testimony that April Ashley might be 
considered intersexual because her chromosomes, gonads and genitals at 
birth were congruent.121 The judge admitted, however, the hypothetical 
case of an intersexual would be more difficult to deal with: 
The real difficulties, of course, will occur if these three criteria are not 
congruent. This question does not arise in the present case and I must 
not anticipate, but it would seem to me to follow from what I have said 
that the greater weight would probably be given to the genital criteria 
than to the other two. This problem and, in particular, the question of 
the effect of surgical operations in such cases of physical inter-sex, 
must be left until it comes for decision.122 
“Great difficulties” would arise for the Corbett judge in dealing with 
intersexuality because that condition challenges basic social assumptions 
about sex — that every person is born either male or female, and that sex 
is easily determined at birth and cannot be altered thereafter. 
Intersexuality defies the common assumptions that sex is dimorphically 
predetermined and that psychological characteristics are irrelevant to 
determining an individual’s sex. 
Corbett provided the basis for two decisions that dealt directly with 
intersexuality. In the 1979 Australian case, In Marriage of C and D,123 
the court relied heavily on Corbett in refusing to uphold the marriage 
between an intersexual male and a woman: “I am satisfied on the 
evidence that the husband was neither man nor woman but was a 
combination of both, and a marriage in the true sense of the word as 
within the definition referred to above could not have taken place and 
does not exist.”124 In effect, the judge concluded that because of a feature 
of birth biology, a person is denied the opportunity to marry. The 
inhumanity of this decision is patent, and no later court has followed the 
case. 
 
 120. Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 42 (P. 1970) (“Anomalies of sex may be divided into 
two broad divisions, those cases which are primarily psychological in character, and those in which 
there are developmental abnormalities in the anatomy of the reproductive system (including the 
external genitalia).”). 
 121. Id. at 46 (“It follows that it has not been established that the respondent should be 
classified as a case of inter-sex on the basis of hormonal abnormality.”). 
 122. Id. at 48-49. 
 123. (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340. 
 124. Id. at 345. The trial judge in Re Kevin responded that: “In relation to his Honour’s 
conclusion that the individual was in law neither a man nor a woman, it is enough to say that I 
cannot imagine any circumstances in which I would be persuaded to accept such a conclusion.” Re 
Kevin, 165 F.L.R. at 439. 
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A more significant case dealing with intersexual marriage is the 
British case, W. v. W.125 In that case, the wife’s chromosomes, genitals 
and gonads were not congruent at birth,126 though she was registered as a 
boy and treated as such growing up.127 She had subsequent surgery to 
align her body to that of a woman.128 Her husband sought to nullify the 
marriage based on the assertion that his wife was not a female at the time 
of marriage.129 Rather than accept an invitation to reconsider Corbett in 
light of recent medical discoveries, the court chose to follow that case 
but viewed the facts as falling within the Corbett exception carved out 
for intersexuals, where an individual’s biological criteria of sex 
(chromosomes, genitals and gonads) are not congruent.130 The W. v. W. 
court noted “[o]n a purely external genital test the respondent was not, 
and was not close to being, a normal man or normal woman.”131 
Accordingly, the genital factor that the Corbett judge speculated might 
be helpful in an intersexual case (and which has proven so important to 
courts dealing with transsexual cases) was of limited use to the court’s 
resolution in W. v. W.132 
The court turned to testimony that genetic evidence would not be 
helpful, and that “psychological matters and the interaction of the 
developing brain and sex hormones . . . could provide points of 
discrimination.”133 The court briefly considered but rejected the 
possibility of concluding that Ms. W. was neither male nor female but 
 
 125. [2001] Fam. 111 (Fam. 2000). 
 126. Based on medical testimony, the court concluded that “the inter-sex state which underlies 
the background to Ms W. is most likely due to the partial androgen insensitivity syndrome. Her 
genetic sex and gonadal sex are male. Her genitalia were ambiguous and her body habitus and 
gender orientation appear female.” Id. at 119. 
 127. Id. at 114-15. 
 128. Reference is made to “reassignment” surgery, see id. at 117, in all likelihood because the 
intersexual had been raised as a boy from birth. Nonetheless, it is conceptually unclear why this term 
should apply to an intersexual, whose body is not truly male or female. Perhaps such surgery is best 
described as “assignment” surgery. 
 129. Id. at 135. 
 130. Id. at 145 (“In my judgment, I am concerned with a case in which the biological test set 
and applied in [Corbett] is not satisfied and does not provide the answer to the question whether the 
respondent is a female for the purposes of marriage. Thus it follows that, in my judgment, I am 
concerned with a case which [the Corbett judge] stated . . . must be left until it comes for decision 
and in respect of which he accepted there were difficulties over and above those he had to deal with 
in Corbett’s case.”). 
 131. Id. at 121. 
 132. The court recognized this directly in its conclusion that “when the genital criteria are 
ambiguous and it cannot be said that they are approaching male or female, sex should not be decided 
by a decision as to which side of the line the genital criteria (internal and external) fall even if they 
would fall on the same side of the line as the other two criteria.” Id. at 141. 
 133. Id. at 120. 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
406 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 18 
rather a third category.134 In rejecting this approach, the court determined 
that “it was the view and intention of Parliament that everyone is either 
male or female for the purposes of marriage. . . .”135 
In attempting to decide which category Ms. W. fell into, the court 
placed importance on the intersexual’s psychological characteristics, in 
particular “her desire from an early age to live as a girl and her final 
choice to live as a woman before she starting taking estrogen and had her 
surgery.”136 In doing so, it clearly went beyond Corbett, which refused to 
even consider psychological testimony. The court, however, did not 
ignore physiological evidence. The court considered it important that Ms. 
W. had undergone irreversible surgery and could no longer live as a 
man.137 Moreover, the court deemed it relevant that Ms. W. was capable 
of consummating her marriage as a woman, and that without surgery 
would have been incapable of even engaging in sexual intercourse.138 
W. v. W. adds little to second and third-wave transsexual marriage 
cases in that it looks to the state of Ms. W.’s body at the time of marriage 
and considers her psychological characteristics in addition to her 
physiology. Nonetheless within the decision are seeds of a radical vision 
of sexual identity. In his conclusions of law, the judge states: 
[P]eople with partial androgen insensitivity can develop physically and 
socially in a range of ways. Their assignment to a sex or gender in 
which they are to be brought up and live is a difficult one and it seems 
to me that in such cases (and in other cases where a decision as to the 
sex or gender in which a child should be brought up falls to be made by 
doctors and others) there is considerable force in the argument that it 
would be best to “wait and see”. How long it would be appropriate to 
 
 134. Id. at 144 (“Further, in my judgment such a result [that a person was neither a man nor a 
woman for the purposes of marriage] would create as many problems as it solved in the difficulties 
that already exist in defining a woman or a man, or a male or a female, for the purposes of marriage 
by creating a third category the boundaries of which would not be clear.” Moreover, the court 
determined that “it was the view and intention of Parliament that everyone is either male or female 
for the purposes of marriage. . . .”). 
 135. Id. at 145. 
 136. Id. at 146. 
 137. Andrew Sharpe points out that the W. v. W. court treated the fact of reassignment surgery 
very differently than did the Corbett court: “[W]hile Mrs. W’s surgery is viewed in terms of a 
process of ‘naturalisation’, predicated upon a problematic view of the intersexed body a nature’s 
‘mistake’, post-operative statuts in the case of April Ashley is viewed as a flight from ‘nature’.” 
ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE – DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 49 (2002). 
 138. W. v. W., [2001] Fam. 111, 144 (Fam. 2000). In the end, the court determined that an 
intersexual’s sex for marriage purposes must be determined in accord with the criteria set forth in 
Corbett, albeit an extended list: chromosomal factors; gonadal factors; genital factors; psychological 
factors; hormonal factors; and secondary sexual characteristics. Applying these factors, the judge 
concluded that Ms. W was a female for marriage purposes. 
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wait, and what tests would be appropriate, would vary from case to 
case.139 
An explanation of the “wait and see” approach is necessary before 
examining the implications for law. Upon the birth of an intersexed child 
with ambiguous genitals, the traditional medical approach stressed the 
importance of deciding upon and surgically determining a child’s sex 
shortly after birth for the child’s psychological well-being. 
“[P]sychologists who first recommended surgery on interested infants 
and children in the 1950s had a similar goal in mind: to prevent the social 
stigma and isolation that was thought to accompany intersexual 
‘difference.’”140 This medical approach complemented the view of 
psychologists such as John Money that a person’s sexual identity is 
malleable — so long as an intersexed child is assigned to a sex at an 
early moment in life, the child can grow up psychologically stable in the 
chosen sex.141 Accordingly, the birth of an intersexed child was treated as 
a medical emergency and parents were encouraged to allow the child to 
undergo appropriate surgery within a short while after birth to render the 
child’s sex unambiguous.142 
Recent medical research, in particular the work of Dr. Milton 
Diamond, has challenged the traditional approach. Diamond has 
questioned the assumption that a person’s sexual identity is malleable.143 
His research regarding “brain sex,” the very same research relied upon in 
the third-wave transsexual marriage cases, strongly suggests that a 
person’s sexual identity is imprinted on the brain from birth and is 
unchangeable.144 Moreover, recent studies of intersexuals who underwent 
early surgery to “correct” their genitals have revealed that later sexual 
function and psychological health may be serious impaired by early 
medical intervention.145 In light of this research, serious opposition has 
now arisen to early medical intervention. Political movements 
spearheaded by adult intersexuals have advocated for delaying corrective 
surgery until the intersexed individual has the emotional maturity to 
 
 139. Id. at 146. 
 140. PREVES, INTERSEX, at 52. 
 141. See id. at 53. 
 142. See PREVES, INTERSEX at 58. See also SUZANNE KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE 
INTERSEXED (1998), at 12-32 (dealing with the medical construction of gender). 
 143. Milton Diamond, Sexual Identity and Sexual Orientation in Children With Traumatized 
or Ambiguous Genitalia, 34 THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 199 (1997). 
 144. If in fact human sexual identity is not malleable but imprinted from birth, it is possible 
that parents and physicians can make a mistake in choosing one sex rather than the other as the goal 
of an infant’s surgery. 
 145. See PREVES, INTERSEX, at 60-86 (reviewing stories of intersexed persons who view 
themselves physically and emotionally injured by early medical intervention). 
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participate in the decision whether to elect such surgery, unless surgery is 
necessary for the infant’s physical health.146 
This “wait and see” approach, applauded by the W. v. W. court, has 
far reaching social implications. To admit that any decision as to the sex 
of an intersexual child should not be made until the individual can 
participate in that decision and that such decision will ultimately turn on 
the individual’s self-perception of his or her sexual identity is to allow 
that, at any one time, there may be individuals in our society who are not 
clearly male or female. Moreover, it is to admit that a person’s 
psychological choice as to his or her sex will be determinative for legal 
purposes. 
Intersexuality has profound implications for marriage in general and 
transsexual marriage in particular: 
1. Every marriage case we have examined is founded on the 
assumption that marriage is by its nature opposite-sexed — i.e., that it is 
the union of a man and a woman. The existence of intersexuals who have 
not undergone surgery presents the possibility of individuals being 
allowed to marry who are neither clearly male nor female. Intersexuality 
challenges the legal insistence that marriage be opposite-sexed. 
2. In discussing intersexuality, courts accept that a person’s 
psychological sex is more important than bodily configuration to 
determining sexual identity. In Otahuhu, the court stated: 
This evidence [concerning intersexuals who delay surgery until they are 
older] supports the view that the psychological and social factors which 
go to make up a person’s gender identity are very powerful, so 
powerful that where there is physical ambiguity they may override the 
chromosomal fact.147 
 
 146. Id. at 144-58. (discussing intersex political mobilization). See also the testimony of a 
medical expert in Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2002] 1 All E.R. 311, 321-22 (2001), discussing the 
movement to delay surgery on intersexed infants until later in life: 
Psychological factors cannot be considered at birth because they do not yet manifest. 
They may become an overriding consideration subsequently as the individual develops. 
Physical differences in the brain are as yet not measurable at birth, if at all later in life. 
They may ultimately override all other criteria. Thus, though not apparent at birth, this 
would influence the ultimate developmental outcome with respect to a newborn . . . . 
[T]here is considerable sentiment for delaying any surgical modification of the genitalia 
which had been thought to help preset the evolving gender identity. Now there is more of 
a wait-and-see approach until the individual is old enough to express its own wishes. . . . 
There is growing acceptance of findings of sexual differences in the brain that are 
determined prenatally. They are seen as influencing sex-typed and sexual behaviors. 
 147. Otahuhu [1995] 1 NZLR at 610; see also Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 569: 
 Abnormalities make categorical determination of sexual identity ambiguous. In such an 
instance “the psychological” and “social” is accepted by the medical and scientific 
community when dealing with persons who have chromosomal, gonadal, genital or 
hormonal abnormalities. Medical science responds. The usual treatment in such cases is 
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Accordingly, intersexuality forces the legal system to rely primarily 
on an individual’s psychological characteristics and self-perception to 
determine sex for marriage purposes. The biological features of a 
person’s body can no longer provide any bright line assistance in this 
determination. But courts’ recognition of intersexuals has important 
implications for dealing with transsexuals.148 In the House of Lords 
decision in Bellinger v. Bellinger, Lord Nicholls noted: 
Recognition of gender reassignment will involve some blurring of the 
normally accepted biological distinction between male and female. 
Some blurring already exists, unavoidably, in the case of inter-sexual 
persons. When assessing the gender of inter-sexual persons, matters 
taken into account include self-perception and style of upbringing and 
living. Recognition of gender reassignment will involve further 
blurring. It will mean that in law a person who, unlike an inter-sexual 
person, had all the biological characteristics of one sex at birth may 
subsequently be treated as a member of the opposite sex.149 
3. Perhaps most importantly, intersexuality forces courts to allow an 
individual to choose his or her sex for purposes of marriage. The Re 
Kevin appeals court made this explicit, in referring to W. v. W.: “It seems 
to us that the important things about this judgment is that it clearly 
recognizes that inter-sex persons can, in effect, choose their sex and 
marry.”150 
Why do intersexuals receive such privileged treatment? Unlike 
transsexuals, whose bodies enable them to be classified as male or 
female at birth, the intersexual body does not provide a clear baseline 
from which sex can be determined. In the case of intersexuals with 
ambiguous genitals at birth, this uncertainty exists from the beginning. 
But even where an individual’s intersexuality is discovered later in life, 
at the time of marriage, the physiological ambiguity gives a court no 
clear physical criteria for determining sex. As a result, courts must turn 
to psychological criteria, which involve reliance upon the individual’s 
statements as to their sexual identity. Only then will a court be in a 
 
to assist the person surgically or hormonally to consolidate the sex into which they are 
most psychologically and socially adjusted.” 
 148. Of course, there may be little difference between the bodies of a post-operative 
transsexual and a post-operative intersexual. Nonetheless, courts appear more willing to rely on the 
intersexual’s self-perception of sexual identity because the condition that led to reassignment surgery 
in the intersexual resulted from a “natural” defect of birth for which the intersexual is not 
responsible. 
 149. Bellinger v. Bellinger, 2 A.C. 467, 477 (H.L. 2003). 
 150. Re Kevin appeal, [2003] 172 F.L.R. 300, at 339. See also id. at 329 (“If . . . a person falls 
into the category of being an inter-sex person, then it would appear that the law permits them to 
choose their “true sex.’”). 
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position to know how to uphold the statutory requirement that marriage 
is the union between a man and a woman. 
Yet courts fail to recognize the irony that if they are willing to rely 
on an intersexual’s choice as to the sex in which s/he wishes to marry, 
why not extend a similar choice to transsexuals, including pre-operative 
transsexuals? Because intersexuality undermines the very notion of 
“opposite-sexed,” intersexual individuals are beyond the state’s ability to 
police opposite-sex marriage. In a curious way, the concern expressed by 
some courts that pre-operative transsexuals might flip back and forth 
between male and female is the least of concerns when it comes to 
intersexuals. Given that they are not firmly in either the male or the 
female “camp” to begin with, flipping back and forth is not an issue. 
4. To the extent that some courts now recognize that the decision as 
to an intersexual’s sex may have to wait until later in life, these cases 
strongly undermine the first-wave cases’ insistence that birth be the 
critical moment for sex determination.151 If one can allow an 
intersexual’s sex to be determined or re-determined at a later moment in 
life, irrespective of what is written on a birth certificate, should this same 
approach be taken for transsexuals? 
5. One reason that courts favor intersexuals over transsexuals is that 
intersexuals are not responsible for the incongruities among their 
genitals, gonads, and chromosomes — they were born that way. In 
contrast, courts seem to blame transsexuals for creating their own 
situations. Having chosen surgery, the post-operative transsexual is 
responsible for his or her reassigned body’s being in conflict with his or 
her “natural” chromosomal make-up. 
But one can also surmise a parallel theological explanation that may 
underlie the favored treatment given to intersexuality. Because the 
intersexual condition exists from birth, courts may well view the Lord as 
directly responsible for the intersexual’s physical ambiguities, i.e., it is 
natural. Accordingly, it would be wrong to deny intersexuals any 
marriage rights accorded others.  In the end, if one accepts that brain sex 
is as important as physiological characteristics in determining a person’s 
sexual identity, then the transsexual should also be deemed intersexed. 
 
 151. See for example the testimony of an expert witness in Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2002] 1 All 
E.R. 311, 322, discussing how “brain sex” can be discovered: 
At present there is probably no method within neuroscience to make such a 
determination. Rather it may be best to abide by the person’s gender identity, which is the 
psychological manifestation as mediated by the brain . . . If a biological sexual condition 
of an individual is conceptualised to include psychological sex, perhaps reflective of 
brain sex differentiation, this status does not express itself until several years postnatally. 
Therefore it is not possible to say that the biological sexual condition of an individual is 
fixed at birth in that not all of the bases of the biological sexual condition can be 
determined at birth . . . As a psychiatrist I am biased towards psychological factors. 
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The only difference is that an individual born with incongruent physical 
features has more prominent evidence of intersexuality than does a 
transsexual, where the incongruity resides within the brain.152 
7. Perhaps the most fascinating question is how a court would deal 
with an intersexual who had not undergone corrective surgery if that 
individual sought to marry. (This was not the case in W. v. W.) Would a 
court actually allow such an individual to choose his or her sex for 
marriage purposes? 
First-wave courts seemed genuinely uncomfortable with an 
intersexual not clearly falling on either side of the sex divide. Thus, in 
contrast to their treatment of transsexuals, one can reasonably speculate 
that first-wave courts might welcome, if not require, an intersexual to 
undergo surgery to clarify his/her body as either male or female. The 
discomfort of acknowledging an individual who defies the dimorphic 
gender divide is extreme. 
But what about progressive courts that relied upon intersexuality to 
support allowing post-operative transsexuals to be recognized in their 
reassigned sex?153 Would such courts require an intersexual to undergo 
any surgery in order to marry in accord with his/her psychological sexual 
identity? No court has yet faced a case in which it must determine for 
marriage purposes the sex of an intersexual with ambiguous genitals that 
outwardly appear female, but whose sexual identity is male (or vice-
versa). In the recent Pulitzer Prize-winning novel by Jeffrey Eugenides, 
Middlesex,154 the protagonist Cal (Calliope) Stephanides was reared 
female. However at the age of fourteen, Cal’s menstrual cycle had not 
begun, his/her chest remained flat, his/her voice became husky, and 
facial hair began to grow. His/her parents took him/her to an 
endocrinologist who determined that s/he was intersexual because of 5-
 
 152. Courts nonetheless distinguish between intersexuals and transsexuals. For example, the 
Appeals Court in Bellinger attempted to distinguish W. v. W. in the following way: 
Miss Cox argued that the petitioner and Mrs W were, after surgery, physiologically the 
same. That similarity does not change the essential fact that Mrs W was, at birth, of 
uncertain sex, and assigned by the choice of her parents to male, whereas the petitioner 
was indisputably male at birth. We cannot see how W v W (Physical Inter-sex) helps the 
petitioner’s case. 
1 All E.R. 311, 326 (C.A. 2001). Obviously, courts are not predisposed to viewing the brain as 
simply another physiological fact about a person. 
 153. See, e.g. Otahuhu [1995] 1 NZLR at 610 (“If in cases of  ‘inter-sex’ the psychological 
factors should be determinative of the sex to be assigned to that individual, surely the same 
reasoning should be used in the case of a post-operative transsexual.  The evidence before the Court 
is that the psychological desire to be able to function in the opposite sex to the sex the person was 
born into is absolutely compelling in the case of a transsexual. Once a transsexual person has 
undergone hormone treatment and surgical intervention in order to make his or her genitals 
congruent with the sex of choice, it is difficult to understand how that person should be treated 
differently from a person who has a physical sexual abnormality such as pseudo hermaphroditism.”). 
 154. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX 435-27 (2002). 
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alpha-reductase deficiency syndrome. Cal had XY chromosomes and 
high plasma testosterone levels; and hidden within her female-appearing 
genitals was a micro-penis. After extensive physiological and 
psychological investigation, the doctor concluded in his medical notes: 
In speech, mannerisms, and dress, the subject manifests a feminine 
gender identity and role, despite a contrary chromosomal status. It is 
clear by this that sex of rearing, rather than genetic determinants, plays 
a greater role in the establishment of gender identity. . . . To leave the 
genitals as they are today would expose her to all manner of 
humiliation. Though it is possible that the surgery may result in partial 
or total loss of herotosexual sensation, sexual pleasure is only one 
factor in a happy life. The ability to marry and pass as a normal woman 
in society are also important goals, both of which will not be possible 
without feminizing surgery and hormone treatment.”155 
These events take place in the novel in the mid-1970s, and it is clear that 
Eugenides fashions the doctor in accord with the now challenged view 
that sexual identity is totally malleable.156 Before surgery could occur, 
however, Cal runs away, writing a note to his/her parents stating, “I am 
not a girl. I’m a boy.”157 Changing his dress and hair style to male, he 
goes to live in San Francisco. 
Eugenides’ novel makes clear that an individual’s self-perception of 
their sexual identity is no simple matter, highly influenced by the social 
facts in which the individual is raised. Cal explains: 
My psychological makeup doesn’t accord with the essentialism popular 
in the intersex movement. . . Unlike other so-called male psedo-
hermaphrodites who have been written about in the press, I never felt 
out of place being a girl. I still don’t feel entirely at home among men. 
Desire made me cross over to the other side, desire and the facticity of 
my body. 
. . . 
 
 155. Id. at 437. 
 156. Eugenides is extremely perceptive as to changes in modern medical understanding: 
It’s no surprise that [the doctor’s] theory of gender identity was popular in the early 
seventies. . . . The consensus was that personality was primarily determined by 
environment, each child a blank slate to be written on. . . . Women were becoming more 
like men and men were becoming more like women. For a little while during the 
seventies it seemed that sexual difference might pass away. 
. . .[The doctor’s] theory has come under attack by the 1990s. The child was no longer a 
blank slate; every newborn had been inscribed by genetics and evolution. 
Id. at 478-79. 
 157. Id. at 439. 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
371] TRANSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 413 
And so a strange new possibility is arising. Compromised, indefinite, 
sketchy, but not entirely obliterated: free will is making a comeback. 
Biology gives you a brain. Life turns it into a mind.158 
Eugenides steers a careful course between the theories of the malleability 
of sexual identity generally accepted in the 1970’s, and the views of 
more recent medical theorists that sexual identity is imprinted in the 
brain. It’s not all nature and it is not all nurture. This novel brilliantly 
illustrates how extremely complex the realm of sexual identity actually 
is. 
For purposes of this article, the lesson of Eugenides’ Middlesex is 
this: In the case of hypothetical intersexuals, progressive courts assert 
that they cannot rely on physiology as a determinant of sex for marriage 
purposes. Instead, they suggest they would rely on the individual’s 
psychological sexual identity to determine the intersexual’s sex. 
Middlesex teaches that sexual identity itself is not a solid evidentiary fact 
about an individual; it is highly influenced by the cultural milieu in 
which the individual is raised. Accordingly, intersexuality raises the 
specter that, for legal purposes, the entire concept of two sexes may be 
no more than a cultural construct. In attempting to police same-sexed 
versus opposite-sexed marriage, courts may be aiming at an extremely 
ephemeral target. 
8. In contrast to the transsexual who will have to present extensive 
psychological evidence that he or she is actually transsexual and has 
undergone the requisite surgery, the intersexual is in the privileged 
position of merely having a doctor testify as to the physical ambiguity. 
Such evidence is far simpler to elicit than psychological evidence of 
transsexuality. How is a court to enforce the legal prohibition against 
same-sex marriage when faced with an intersexual? Does a court simply 
allow the intersexual to marry anyone he or she wishes? Or does a court 
ask first what the individual’s sexual identity is, and only if the sex of the 
proposed partner is the opposite of that identity does the court permit the 
marriage? What if the professed sexual identity is contrary to other 
physical and social indicators of gender? The individual likes to dress in 
pants, play football, and repair automobiles, but self-identifies as a 
woman. Does the court refuse to believe the professed sexual identity? 
The entire edifice crumbles the moment that one recognizes that 
sexual identity does not automatically accord with sexual orientation. An 
extremely feminine intersexual with female-appearing genitals who self-
identifies as a woman may be attracted to women. Does a court allow her 
to marry another woman? The same feminine intersexual with female-
 
 158. Id. at 479. 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
414 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 18 
appearing genitals may self-identify as a heterosexual man. Does the 
court allow that individual to marry a woman? What if the intersexual 
self-identifies as androgynous and perhaps bisexual, what does a court do 
then? 
9. In the end, intersexuality flatly confounds the underlying 
assumption of every court that sex is dimorphic and that every litigant 
before it is either a man or a woman. The existence of intersexuals 
undermines the very enterprise that these courts have undertaken so 
exhaustively — to police the legal prohibition against same-sex 
marriage. 
IV.  INSIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Let us recap what the transsexual and intersexual marriage cases 
demonstrate. The first-wave transsexual cases revealed that the 
configuration of a person’s body at birth has little to do with the goals of 
marriage. Moreover, relying on a person’s body at birth does not enable a 
court to enforce the legal prohibition against same-sex marriage. To 
insist that a person marry as a member of the sex determined at birth is to 
allow an M-T-F post-operative transsexual with a woman’s body and a 
woman’s psyche to marry only another woman. The first-wave courts’ 
resolute reliance on birth biology led to the ironic result that, in the 
fervor to avoid same-sex marriage, these courts effectively relegated all 
post-operative transsexuals only to a same-sex marriage. 
The second-wave transsexual courts correctly recognized that 
looking to a person’s bodily configuration at the time of marriage was 
more relevant to the goals of marriage than looking to the time of birth. 
Having said that, these courts imposed the highly discriminatory 
requirements that the transsexual either be able to function sexually in 
the reassigned sex or at least pass the appearance test as a member of the 
reassigned sex. In addition, all second-wave courts required that the 
transsexual’s body surgically harmonize with the transsexual’s sexual 
identity. Yet imposing any of these requirements is highly 
discriminatory. The sexual function, appearance, and harmonization 
requirements are never imposed on non-transsexuals wishing to marry. 
Moreover, all prove highly problematic for F-T-M transsexuals who have 
not undergone phalloplasty. 
The third-wave courts eliminated the sexual function and appearance 
requirements. In terms of fairness, this was a clear improvement over 
previous cases. Yet these courts continued to require that a transsexual 
undergo some irreversible surgery in order to marry in the reassigned 
sex. As argued above, this requirement has little to do with the goals of 
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marriage, and much more to do with alleviating the anxiety of the courts 
that they might be condoning same-sex marriage. 
Finally, the hypothetical case of the intersexual seeking to marry is, 
in a sense, the straw that broke the camel’s back in terms of the courts’ 
attempt to police against same-sex marriage. What insights can be 
learned from the transsexual and intersexual cases about same-sex 
marriage? 
1. These cases offer a simple, yet profound, insight. Were the law to 
drop the requirement that marriage be opposite-sexed and, instead, 
extend marriage rights to all consenting adults, the difficulties confronted 
in these marriage cases would disappear. For purposes of marriage, 
courts would no longer need to struggle to determine the sex of 
intersexuals or transsexuals, whether postoperative or preoperative. The 
expense of parties having to engage medical experts and the 
extraordinary time that courts have to devote to such testimony would be 
eliminated. Moreover, such a move would finally eliminate the 
unfairness of prohibiting couples who identify themselves as same-sexed 
to marry. 
2. The cases make clear that even if one is committed to the principle 
that marriage should be limited to the union of a man and a woman, 
pinning down exactly who is a man and who is a woman is not always an 
easy task. With respect to transsexuals and intersexuals, the medical 
evidence elicited in the cases suggests that there is simply no bright line 
between male and female, i.e., that sex is not a binary category. 
Accordingly, the unquestioned assumption that the opposite-sex marriage 
requirement is easily enforced is, in reality, highly problematic. 
3. In discussing hypothetical cases, intersexuality forced courts to 
give up the hope trying to pin down a person’s sex for purposes of 
marriage by turning to clear, settled criteria. The seemingly solid, 
irrefutable evidence used daily to determine a newborn’s sex loses its 
power to determine an intersexual’s sex. Given the inconclusive nature 
of this physical data, rather than conclude that intersexuals cannot marry, 
most courts have suggested that they have little choice but accede to the 
intersexual’s choice of sex as the determining factor for marriage. But 
recent studies of intersexuals suggest that many do not in fact construct 
their identity as dimorphically male or female. Instead, many 
intersexuals choose to respect his/her birth body and thus consider 
themselves to be androgynous.159 In such a case, the law’s requirement 
that marriage be opposite-sexed would leave the intersexual little choice 
but to announce their sex as supportive of their sexual orientation, 
 
 159. See anecdotal interviews with transsexuals in PREVES, INTERSEX, at 1-22; 125-143. 
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thereby enabling them to marry the person of their choice by declaring 
their sex as opposite to that person. 
4. This article has questioned why bodies matter to the institution of 
marriage. I have suggested that given the modern, companionate goals of 
marriage, it should be irrelevant to the state how a person’s body is 
configured in terms of what genitals one partner has compared to the 
other. I do not mean to suggest, however, that a person’s physical body is 
irrelevant to marriage. For, without bodies, a couple cannot engage in a 
satisfying, intimate sexual relationship that, for so many, is at the core of 
a successful marriage. Thus, the bodies that a couple brings to marriage 
do have an important relationship to the success of a marriage. 
What matters to a successful marriage, however, is not that each 
partner’s genitals be arrayed in any particular way in relation to the 
genitals of the other partner. What matters is how a person’s body 
enables him or her to give and to receive sexual and emotional 
satisfaction from an intimate relationship with a partner. Giving and 
receiving sexual satisfaction is not limited to bodies that are opposite-
sexed or same-sexed or transsexed or intersexed. What the transsexual 
and intersexual marriage cases teach is that if the state is truly interested 
in fostering the institution of marriage, it should stop trying to police the 
body parts that a couple must have in order to marry. 
5. Much of this article has approved the direction of recent 
transsexual and intersexual cases, away from a focus on purely 
physiological criteria, to a focus on psychological criteria in determining 
a person’s sex for marriage purposes. But I am now forced to ask one 
final question. Are the courts that have placed greater reliance on 
psychological criteria correct to look to “brain sex” and sexual identity as 
that particular brain state most relevant to marriage? 
What these cases reveal is that, if one is interested in successful 
marriage, the most relevant psychological characteristic is not “brain 
sex.” Rather, the psychological characteristic that most matters to a 
couple’s physical and emotional satisfaction is sexual orientation. If our 
society is truly committed to successful marriages, we need to respect 
whatever sexual orientation a consenting, adult couple may have. 
Relying on “brain sex” and sexual identity simply focuses on the wrong 
psychological state. 
This is further supported by the understanding that sexual identity 
and sexual orientation may not be congruent. A court’s reliance on a 
person’s sexual identity as male or female simply does not assure that 
they will fulfill the social requirement that they be opposite-sex oriented. 
Persons born male, F-T-M transsexuals who view themselves as male, 
and intersexed individuals with a male sexual identity may all be 
10KOGAN.MACRO 5/25/2004  11:41 PM 
371] TRANSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 417 
attracted to females. But this is by no means assured. Each of these 
persons may also be same-sex oriented, and be attracted to men. Our 
society conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation, assuming all 
integrates, in one particular way; this is simply not the case.160 
Once we give up the requirement that marriage must be limited to 
two people who can biologically procreate with one another (as opposed 
to procreating through adoption or alternative reproductive technologies) 
and focus on the fact that modern marriage is fundamentally about 
companionate goals (and for some, but not all, couples about 
procreation), any inquiry into sexual identity should be irrelevant as a 
gate-keeper for marriage. If two people are going to be successful in 
marriage, the brain state that matters most is that they be sexually 
attracted to one another. 
6. The cases we have explored also teach that the world of sexual 
orientation is far more complex than the simplistic division into 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality. The world of sexual 
orientation includes people who are attracted to transsexuals and 
intersexuals who may or may not have undergone surgery. In Eugenides’ 
Middlesex, is the woman who falls in love with Cal straight or gay? She 
is attracted to an individual who in his teens adopts a male sexual 
identity, but continues to have female-appearing genitals. What about 
Kevin’s wife in Re Kevin? She has fallen in love with an F-T-M 
transsexual who has a male sexual identity, some male body features 
(e.g., chest musculature and hair), but also a vagina. Is she gay, straight, 
or bisexual? Though one can try to force each case into one of these 
boxes, these cases make clear that sexual orientation is far more complex 
than generally assumed. 
In the same way that determining what is meant by a same-sex or an 
opposite-sex marriage is complicated by the transsexual and intersexual 
cases we have reviewed, similarly the notion of heterosexual verses a 
homosexual marriage is equally problematic. Natural human variance 
defies any attempt to divide the world into these dualities and, in turn, to 
structure marriage based on these supposed opposites. 
7. In the end, the state should give up its concern about the sex of 
partners to a marriage. What is critical for the success of a marriage is 
that two people be physically and emotionally attracted to one another in 
such a way that they are motivated to make a long-term commitment to 
 
 160. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, 
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996); Francisco Valdes, 
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and 
“Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
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supporting and nurturing each other; and that is not necessarily related to 
either partner’s sex or sexual identity. 
The ultimate lesson we can derive from the transsexual and 
intersexual marriage cases is this: Marriage should be available to all 
couples — those who experience themselves as opposite-sex, those who 
experience themselves as same-sex, and those who experience 
themselves as some variation thereof. 
 
